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CHAPTER 1
FACTS ABOUT SALES
1.1 Introduction
The long running debate about price stickiness has recently focused on temporary price reductions (sales
hereafter). Many of the items that compose the CPI basket exhibit frequent price changes. This posed
a challenge to New Keynesian models that rely heavily on explicitly rigid prices to generate real eﬀects of
money (Bils and Klenow, 2004; Nakamura and Steinsson, 2008). However, a large portion of price changes
are temporary reductions followed by a return to the regular price and are commonly referred to as sales
(Klenow and Kryvtsov, 2008).
Several recent articles analyze whether sales are necessarily inconsistent with sticky price models
(Eichenbaum, Jaimovich and Rebelo, 2011; Kehoe and Midrigan, 2010; Guimaraes and Sheedy, 2011, which
I will refer to as EJR, KM, and GS hereafter). These studies uniformly conclude that sales are not an
important source of aggregate price ﬂexibility. Eichenbaum, et al. conclude ...a lot of high-frequency
volatility in prices and quantities has little to do with monetary policy and is perhaps best ignored by macro
economists. This raises two empirical questions that, to the best of my knowledge, have not been addressed:
1) How do aggregate characteristics of sales vary over time? and 2) How important are sales in understanding
aggregate price movements?
These questions are motivated by a simple thought experiment: if households face an unexpected
reduction in nominal income, would they tend to buy more items at a sale price? Alternatively, if a store
faced a reduction in demand, would managers change the frequency and/or depth of their price promotions?
If the answer to either of these questions is yes, then we ought to reconsider the conclusion that sales are
unimportant for macro economists. This idea is closely related to the analysis in Chevalier and Kashyap
(2011), who show that stores may respond to certain types of demand shocks by adjusting the frequency or
size of sales.
In this chapter I use scanner data to document several facts about the aggregate behavior of sales.
My primary source of data is the IRI research database, which contains six years of weekly scanner data on
31 categories from a sample of grocery and drug stores located in 50 US markets.1 I supplement the analysis
1To learn more about this database, see Bronnenberg, Bart J., Michael W. Kruger, Carl F. Mela. 2008. Database paper:
The IRI marketing data set. Marketing Science, 27(4) 745-748. I wish to thank SymphonyIRI for making this data available.
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with the Dominick's Finer Foods (DFF) database, a publicly available scanner data set from the University
of Chicago's Booth School of Business.2 I document the following ﬁve facts about about the nature of sales:
1. Sales account for as much as 45% of revenue (depending on the category).
2. Sale frequency is positively correlated with expenditure share (across categories and across products).
3. Most monthly variation in average unit price is due to changes in the frequency and size of sales and
is not reﬂected in the CPI.
4. When demand faced by a multiproduct retailer falls, the fraction of revenue from sales tends to increase.
5. Sales are generally staggered (a) across stores (b) across products produced by the same manufacturer,
and (c) across products within a store.
Taken together, these facts suggest that sales play an important role in the evolution of average unit price
and nominal expenditure. They imply that we should think carefully about how we interpret the CPI,
particularly when it is used to convert nominal magnitudes into real magnitudes. The facts are not consistent
with models of sales in which idiosyncratic and transient cost shocks are the primary reason that sales occur.
Rather, they support alternative models that rely on some combination of inventory management, consumer
heterogeneity, search costs, and strategic behavior to generate intertemporal price dispersion. In Chapter 2,
I discuss how these facts pertain to various models of sales and then sketch a model in which sales tend to
dampen the eﬀect of demand shocks on output.
Road map for Chapter 1
Section 1.2 describes both data sources and includes a discussion of how I selected the sample for this analysis.
In Section 1.3 I describe the algorithm used to identify regular prices and sales. I present highly aggregated
summary statistics and establish facts (1) and (2) in Section 1.4. Section 1.5 looks at aggregate dynamics of
sales by comparing indexes of average regular price and average unit price over time. Fact (3) comes from
this section. Fact (4) is established in Section 1.6, which studies how grocery and drug chains use sales to
respond to large changes in demand. Section 1.7 analyzes the extent to which sales are synchronized and
section 1.8 concludes.
Information Resources, Inc. (IRI) has changed its name to SymphonyIRI Group, Inc. All estimates and analyses in this paper
based on SymphonyIRI Group, Inc. data are by the author and not by SymphonyIRI Group, Inc.
2To obtain data from the Dominick's Finer Foods Database, visit the University of Chicago's Booth School website:
http://research.chicagobooth.edu/marketing/databases/dominicks/
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1.2 Data
Scanner data have three important advantages over BLS survey data for studying pricing behavior. First,
quantity sold is available which indicates (among other things) how important a particular price is.3 Second,
scanner data contain weekly observations and tend to pick up almost all movements in prices since intra
week price movements are rare. BLS survey data are sampled monthly or bimonthly. Finally, with scanner
data we observe the price and quantity sold of all products available within a category-store.
The scanner data I use come from two sources: Dominick's Finer Foods via the University of Chicago
Booth School of Business and the IRI marketing data set provided by Information Resources Inc (Bronnen-
berg et al., 2008).
Dominick's Finer Foods
The Dominick's Finer Foods (DFF) database is available publicly via the University of Chicago Booth School
of Business. The database contains weekly scanner data (price and quantity sold) for 29 categories sold in
each of the chain's 90 diﬀerent stores located near Chicago, IL from 1989 until 1996.
These data cover all stores operated by a single chain and provide the exact location of each store.
Unfortunately, the stores are located in a small geographic area and tell us only about the pricing behavior
of a single ﬁrm. However, they do span the recession of 1991 so we can analyze how DFF reacted to this
particular recession.
There are also some gaps in the data. Several categories are missing for certain months. I am able to
construct a balanced panel of 22 categories covering October 1989 to August 1994 (58 months). In most of
the analysis that follows I will uses this subset of categories.
IRI Marketing Data
Information Resources, Inc. have recently made a much larger set of scanner data available for academic
research (Bronnenberg et al., 2008). These data cover 31 categories in 50 diﬀerent markets and contain
both grocery stores and drug stores from several diﬀerent chains. The data have detailed information about
product attributes and also contain information about other marketing activity such as feature and display.
The primary disadvantage to this data is that we cannot determine the exact location of the stores or the
demographics of the shoppers who typically visit them. The data span the relatively mild recession of 2001,
but contains very few observations prior to its onset.
3Stigler and Kindahl (1970) showed that transaction prices are far more informative and often behave diﬀerently than list
prices.
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Table 1.1: IRI Sample Markets
Market Stores Chains Items
Observations
(millions)
Revenue
($million/year)
Dallas 17 5 181,628 23.3 67
Hartford 11 5 129,921 17.1 66
Houston 17 4 168,303 21.4 64
Los Angeles 57 5 555,632 69.5 238
New England 24 4 255,051 33.9 157
New York 35 6 392,104 49.9 203
Philadelphia 19 6 212,600 26.9 90
Phoenix 16 4 175,750 22.1 77
Raleigh 19 4 178,943 23.2 63
Sacramento 14 5 138,184 17.5 52
San Francisco 27 5 250,950 31.0 115
Seattle/Tacoma 15 4 149,220 18.7 54
St. Louis 14 4 148,557 19.9 93
Syracuse 7 4 75,827 9.5 42
Total 292 65 3,012,670 383.9 1,380
Notes: For most of the analysis in this chapter, I use only the markets listed above. It includes all IRI
markets with at least four diﬀerent chains that provided a balanced panel for all six years.
Only some of the chains found in the IRI research database provided data for all six years (2001-2006).
I do not want changes in the composition of panels to be a source of variation in aggregate measures, so I
only include stores with data for all six years in this analysis. Also, for practical purposes, I only present
statistics from markets with at least four chains in sections two and three. The resulting panel used in
sections two and three contains 14 markets, 65 chains, and 292 stores. Table 1.1 summarizes the markets
included in the sample. For the price index construction and for all of section four I include all 50 markets.
Missing Item-Weeks
If a UPC was not scanned at a particular store in a particular week, then that store-UPC-week is missing
from the data. There are two reasons that an item was not scanned: 1) the item was not available at the
time, or 2) the item was available but not purchased. If an observation is missing because of (2), then I
want an observation for that week (with the actual price and zero units sold). Otherwise it should remain
as missing.
I assume that if an item was not scanned for 9 weeks or more, then it was not available. If a store-UPC
is missing for fewer than 9 weeks, I set the quantity sold to zero and the price equal to the most recently
observed regular price. This is based on the assumption that an item is unlikely to sell zero units if it is on
sale.
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Loyalty Cards and Store Coupons
One diﬃculty with using scanner data arises from the use of loyalty cards and store coupons. These promo-
tions result in diﬀerent prices for diﬀerent shoppers within the week. Scanner data only allow us to compute
the average price paid during the week. This makes identifying regular price less straightforward because
store speciﬁc discounts that don't apply to all shoppers show up as small week-to-week variation in price.
The algorithm used above will typically not identify these average price ﬂuctuations as sales unless they
result in a temporarily large drop in price. The eﬀect on my analysis will be to overestimate the ﬂexibility
of regular price and to underestimate the use of sales.
1.3 Deﬁning the Regular Price and Identifying a Sale
To proceed, I need to construct two variables: 1) a binary indicator of whether the item was on sale and 2)
the non-sale (or regular) price (which is diﬀerent from the observed price when an item is on sale). Ideally
these variables would come straight from the store, but they are not provided in the data on a consistent
basis so I construct them myself using an algorithm discussed in detail below.4
There are several operational deﬁnitions of sale and regular prices used in the literature. I ﬁnd that
they are not well suited for this study because they tend to miss sales that are more complicated than a one
or two week drop in price followed by a return to the previous price (see Appendix A).
An Operational Deﬁnition of Regular Price and Sale
Part of the diﬃculty in settling on an operational deﬁnition of a sale is that there is no widely accepted
theoretically based deﬁnition of a sale. My starting point for settling this issue is the fact that an item's
price is usually one of two frequently observed prices (Eichenbaum et al., 2011). In chapter two, I present
a simple model in which stores select randomly between two prices. In this model, the higher of the two
prices is the regular price and the lower of the two is analogous to the sale price. Thus, I use the following
algorythm to create a series of regular prices for each product.
I start by setting the regular price to the observed price whenever it is larger than or equal to the
13 week centered moving average price. If the observed price does not change for six weeks or more, then
the observed price in those weeks is the regular price. Also, if two adjacent prices are equal and one is the
regular price (as determined above), then they are both the regular price.5 Following Kehoe and Midrigan
4The DFF data contain a deal ﬂag that is widely understood to be incomplete. The IRI data contain a price reduction
indicator that is computed using IRI's proprietary algorithm for identifying sale prices. For consistency and transparency I
chose to create my own sale indicator. I use the IRI sale ﬂag as a benchmark for evaluating the algorithm.
5The purpose of this is to ensure that regular price changes in the week that we observe the change. It is needed when
regular price falls because the moving average is slower to fall.
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Figure 1.3.1: Regular Price Filter Example from the Data
Notes: This is an example (Pepsi 2-Liter bottles at a store in New York City) from the IRI data set.
The thin red line represents the scanned price and the thick blue line is the regular price, as determined
by the regular price algorithm described in the text. All prices that are 5% or more below the regular
price line are considered sale prices, which are represented by green dots.
(2010), I set the remaining unspeciﬁed regular prices equal to the previous period's regular price.
Now I have an observed price series and a regular price series. An item is considered to be on sale if
the observed price is at least ﬁve percent below the regular price.6
Figure 1.3.2 shows an example of the regular price series that I constructed using the algorithm
described above. The dots represent the observed price series. This particular example is Pepsi 2 Liter
Bottles from a store in New York City. It happens to be the number one revenue generating store-UPC in
the sample of carbonated beverages sold in New York City. Notice that there are several instances in which
the price drops in one week and then drops further the next week before returning to the regular price. This
illustrates that a sale is often more complicated than a simple price drop followed by a return to the previous
price.
Comparison versus Other Methodologies
To give the reader some idea of how various deﬁnitions of regular price and sale prices compare, I provide
several examples from the data as well as some summary statistics. Figure 1.3.2 compares the regular price
ﬁlter I use to the ﬁlter used in Kehoe and Midrigan (2010). I select a top selling UPC from each of four
6Chevalier and Kashyap use a similar tolerance to allow for the fact that there are occasional small price measurement errors.
These errors result from the fact that price is calculated from total dollar sales and total unit sales.
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Table 1.2: Sale Deﬁnition Comparison for Top 10 Categories
Correlation Matrix IRI Glandon K-M C-E
Sales % of
Observations
IRI 1.00 38.5%
Glandon 0.75 1.00 30.9%
Kehoe-Midrigan 0.64 0.71 1.00 28.6%
Campbell-Eden 0.40 0.50 0.45 1.00 11.4%
Notes: Columns two through four contain the correlation between pairs of sale deﬁnitions indicated by the
column and row headers. Column 6 indicates the fraction of observations that are identiﬁed as a sale using
the deﬁnition speciﬁed in column 1. The sample used for this comparison is the top ten revenue generating
categories in the Los Angeles market. I also limit the comparison to the top 1,000 UPCs in each category
for computational purposes. Sale % of observations is weighted by revenue.
categories to show how the two deﬁnitions diﬀer from each other. The Kehoe-Midrigan ﬁlter will occasionally
select the lowest frequently charged price as the regular price.
Table 1.2 provides the total fraction of price quotes identiﬁed as a sale by each of the following
deﬁnitions of sales: 1) IRI's proprietary deﬁnition, 2) The Glandon deﬁnition (used in this paper), 3) The
Kehoe-Midrigan adaptation (5% below the Kehoe-Midrigan regular price), 4) the deﬁnition used in Campbell
and Eden (2005).7 I also include a correlation matrix of the binary sale indicators. The IRI deﬁnition ﬁnds
the most sales (39 percent) and the Glandon deﬁnition has the highest correlation with the IRI deﬁnition
(0.75) but ﬁnds eight percentage points fewer sales in the sample analyzed.8
1.4 Summary Statistics
There are three characteristics of sales that deserve our attention:
1. Frequency (measured by fraction of items on sale per week)
2. Size (percentage discount oﬀ of the regular price)
3. Quantity Ratio (quantity sold per sale relative to quantity sold per regular price).
Frequency and size are often referred to in the marketing literature as the breadth and depth of price
promotions and are determined by the store's managers in order to maximize proﬁt given expectations
about shopper behavior (Blattberg et al., 1995). The quantity ratio is the quantity sold per sale relative to
the quantity sold at the regular price. It measures the consumer's response to sales.
7The IRI research database includes a binary sale indicator variable called PR. Campbell and Eden (2005) deﬁnes a sale as
an x% or larger drop in price that is completely reversed within two weeks.
8For computational purposes, I limit the sample to the top 10 categories and the top 1,000 UPCs in each category for the
Los Angeles market.
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Figure 1.3.2: Regular Price Filter Comparison: Four Examples
Notes: The ﬁgures above compare the regular price ﬁlter described in the text to the Kehoe-Midrigan regular price ﬁlter. I
select one UPC from each of four categories: Beer, Carbonated Beverages, Cold Cereal, and Salty Snacks. Each UPC is one
of the top four selling UPCs from the Los Angeles market. The top chart for each category uses the Glandon Filter and the
bottom chart uses the Kehoe-Midrigan ﬁlter. These examples were selected to illustrate how the two diﬀerent ﬁlters diﬀer
from each other.
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Table 1.3: Summary Statistics by Category: Dominick's Finer Foods
Annual
Revenue Sales fraction of total: Median
Median
Quantity
Category Products Months $Millions Weeks Revenue Units Discount Ratio
Soft Drinks 162 90 51.3 34.2% 70% 67% 20% 5.5
Cereals 110 86 29.0 9.6% 23% 29% 12% 2.8
Cheeses 134 91 25.0 25.1% 40% 46% 9% 1.9
Refrigerated Juices 39 91 16.1 34.6% 60% 68% 14% 3.5
Laundry Detergent 139 91 15.6 10.7% 41% 43% 12% 4.7
Frozen Entrees 220 91 14.9 18.4% 43% 53% 20% 4.7
Cookies 188 90 13.1 17.6% 38% 42% 13% 3.0
Beer 88 71 10.8 28.2% 58% 57% 14% 3.7
Bottled Juice 117 91 10.1 20.3% 34% 39% 10% 2.4
Bathroom Tissue 31 91 9.6 23.9% 49% 57% 10% 4.1
Canned Soup 130 91 9.2 14.5% 26% 30% 10% 2.0
Frozen Juices 44 91 7.4 22.3% 46% 53% 14% 3.6
Snack Crackers 85 89 7.3 22.8% 38% 42% 12% 2.1
Paper Towels 27 91 6.7 22.6% 38% 43% 9% 2.8
Canned Tuna 50 91 5.3 21.0% 41% 50% 9% 2.5
Cigarettes 4 91 5.0 4.2% 5% 5% 2% 1.5
Shampoos 453 52 5.0 11.3% 24% 31% 20% 3.7
Fabric Softeners 73 91 4.7 12.7% 27% 26% 9% 2.5
Dish Detergent 70 91 4.6 12.2% 27% 33% 10% 3.0
Grooming Products 229 63 4.5 11.7% 21% 25% 16% 2.8
Frozen Dinners 84 59 4.3 22.9% 42% 51% 17% 4.0
Soaps 72 64 4.2 14.7% 25% 26% 9% 2.0
Analgesics 119 91 4.0 7.3% 15% 16% 13% 2.7
Front End Candies 102 91 4.0 11.3% 17% 24% 15% 2.0
Crackers 60 88 3.7 22.8% 36% 41% 11% 2.3
Toothpaste 115 91 3.2 13.0% 29% 33% 15% 3.5
Oatmeal 24 71 3.2 13.4% 25% 33% 12% 2.7
Toothbrushes 118 91 1.2 12.2% 24% 28% 20% 3.0
Bath Soap 75 63 0.3 6.0% 14% 18% 18% 3.9
All Categories 3,162 283.3 17.0% 43% 47% 13.7% 3.5
Notes: Column 2, is the number of unique products contained in the sample. A product corresponds to a UPC
unless there are several UPCs that DFF identiﬁes as the same item, in which case the product is identiﬁed by the
variable nitem from the Dominick's UPC ﬁle. Column 5 is the fraction of product-store-weeks that contained a
sale price. Columns 6 (7) are the units sold (revenue) from sales divided by the total units sold (revenue). Column 8
is the median discount for products that were on sale (preg − psale)/preg . Column 9 is the median of the quantity
ratio. The quantity ratio is qsale/qreg where qsale and qreg are the quantity of items sold per week on sale and
quantity of items sold per week at the regular price.
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Table 1.4: IRI Summary Statistics by Category
Store x
Annual
Revenue Sales Fraction of Total Median
Median
Quantity
Category Products ($Millions) Weeks Revenue Units Discount Ratio
Carbonated Beverages 225,408 180.0 21.9% 43.0% 44.5% 22.1% 1.9
Beer 125,690 136.0 16.6% 35.0% 30.1% 11.7% 1.8
Cold Cereal 160,894 107.3 16.1% 31.8% 41.5% 30.3% 2.9
Salty Snacks 317,814 104.5 17.6% 32.1% 35.8% 21.4% 2.0
Frozen Dinners 237,906 68.7 25.7% 42.5% 48.1% 28.3% 2.6
Yogurt 147,471 57.7 20.2% 28.0% 39.3% 23.9% 2.0
Toilet Tissue 35,925 49.7 17.5% 39.6% 35.3% 23.7% 3.2
Laundry Detergent 87,963 48.5 16.5% 35.7% 44.8% 24.1% 3.1
Soup 138,809 44.8 14.1% 29.6% 36.9% 27.1% 3.0
Frozen Pizza 81,255 38.0 25.7% 42.7% 49.6% 24.1% 2.7
Coﬀee 103,386 37.0 13.8% 32.2% 39.4% 19.3% 2.7
Paper Towels 31,729 35.5 14.7% 36.4% 31.0% 22.6% 2.6
Hot dogs 28,152 26.7 22.2% 36.8% 48.3% 29.8% 2.4
Spaghetti Sauce 78,634 26.5 17.5% 33.5% 41.9% 22.7% 2.7
Diapers 80,693 23.2 14.5% 23.8% 27.3% 15.4% 2.5
Margarine and Butter 31,970 19.3 16.3% 22.6% 29.0% 22.7% 1.7
Mayonnaise 24,292 17.3 12.0% 26.7% 31.1% 21.6% 2.1
Facial Tissue 28,251 16.3 19.6% 31.7% 38.8% 23.6% 2.1
Toothpaste 122,630 16.0 13.0% 27.6% 34.3% 22.4% 2.7
Shampoos 223,410 14.1 11.4% 21.6% 29.0% 23.0% 3.0
Peanut Butter 21,693 13.6 14.0% 24.6% 34.0% 19.2% 2.2
Mustard and Ketchup 42,846 12.1 9.4% 23.2% 30.5% 19.1% 2.3
Deodorant 213,178 12.0 10.1% 21.3% 28.1% 25.1% 3.1
Blades 58,811 11.4 8.6% 13.3% 18.7% 20.2% 2.3
Household Cleaners 33,456 6.9 13.8% 22.4% 27.7% 19.5% 2.1
Toothbrushes 76,042 5.5 12.6% 25.8% 32.1% 25.1% 3.1
Sugar Substitutes 12,911 5.1 6.8% 9.9% 11.9% 13.1% 1.7
Photo Supplies 14,725 3.2 7.2% 20.0% 23.0% 21.3% 2.7
Razors 16,179 1.5 9.5% 21.2% 22.9% 16.7% 2.6
All Categories 3,012,670 1,380.5 16.7% 34.2% 39.5%
Notes: Same as Table 1.3 notes. Column 2 contains the number of store-UPC combinations in the data (larger than the
number of UPCs since most UPCs are sold at several stores). These summary statistics aggregate across all of the markets
listed in Table 1.1.
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Tables 1.3 and 1.4 contain summary statistics by category for the DFF and IRI samples respectively.
The table includes the following measures of sales: fraction of weeks on sale, fraction of revenue from sales,
fraction of units sold at a sale price, the median discount, and the median quantity ratio. I also provide the
number of products (store-products for the IRI sample) and average annual revenue for the entire sample.
There are several things worth mentioning about these statistics.
First, although sales account for a small fraction of price quotes, they account for a relatively large
fraction of revenue. About 15 percent of price quotes are sales (14 percent for DFF and 17 percent for IRI)
while more than a third of revenue is generated from sales (43 percent for the DFF sample and 34 percent
for the IRI sample). Two to three times as many units are sold during a sale week compared to a regular
price week (as measured by the quantity ratio).
Second, the larger categories tend to have sales more frequently. Figure 1.4.1 illustrates this by plotting
annual revenue against fraction of items on sale. There is a positive relationship between a category's share
of expenditure and its frequency of sales.
This relationship also holds at the UPC level as well. To show this, I calculate average weekly revenue
for each UPC in the sample and separate UPCs into deciles by store. I plot the average fraction of weeks
on sale by revenue decile in Figure 1.4.2. There is a strong positive relationship between an items long run
revenue share and the frequency with which it is on sale. This relationship is consistent with the idea that
sales are often used to attract trips to the store (Chevalier et al., 2003; Hosken and Reiﬀen, 2004; Lal and
Matutes, 1994).
Third, the discount is often quite large. In the IRI data, the median discount versus regular price
is over 20 percent for 21 of the 29 categories and over 25 percent for six of them. If shoppers are willing
to search for deals, hold some inventory, and selectively substitute, substantial savings are available from
buying on sale. One study has found that households in the UK save an average of 6.5 percent of annual
expenditure by buying on sale(Griﬃth et al., 2008).
Finally, sales result in far more purchases than a regular price. In the IRI sample 2.6 times as much
revenue is generated per sale price than per regular price. The spike in quantity sold during a sale is much
higher than can be explained by a simple model of supply and demand (Hendel and Nevo, 2006; ?; Feenstra
and Shapiro, 2003).
To summarize, sale prices occur most frequently on popular items, discounts are often 20% or more, and
a disproportionate share of purchases occur at sales prices. These facts indicate that sales are an important
determinant of average price paid (unit price) and also nominal consumption expenditure. Chevalier and
Kashyap (2011) suggest that average unit price (or more practically, an average of best price and regular
price) provides a better picture of the price consumers are paying over time than any individual price series.
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Figure 1.4.1: Annual Revenue versus Fraction of Items on Sale by Category
Notes: Each point represents a category. The vertical axis is fraction of item-weeks on sale and the
horizontal axis is average annual revenue (as reported in Tables 1.3 and 1.4).
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Figure 1.4.2: Fraction of Weeks on Sale by Average Weekly Revenue Decile
Notes: This ﬁgure plots average fraction of weeks on sale by (within store) average
weekly revenue decile.
In the following section I will quantify the eﬀect of sales on the dynamics of average unit price.
1.5 Sales and Aggregate Price Adjustment
Most of the macro literature cited above concludes that sales are not a signiﬁcant source of aggregate price
ﬂexibility. A corollary to this claim is that the quantity response to sales and the frequency and depth of
sales are static features of the economy. In this section, I test the hypothesis that the characteristics of sales
are constant over time. I ﬁnd that sales do change over time and as a result, average unit price is much more
volatile than regular price.
Ultimately we would like to know whether and how the characteristics of sales are related to business
cycles and monetary policy shocks. Unfortunately, the data I have cover only six years during which there
was one mild recession (2001) so a conclusive study of the behavior of sales business cycles is not possible
using these data. Nevertheless, I show that a large increase in the fraction of items on sale coincides with
an increase in the unemployment rate.
Unit Price versus Regular Price
I begin by looking at the behavior of sales within each store-product over time. Consider the following
expression of the average price per unit sold of store-product i during quarter t:
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Uit = (1− wit)Rit + witSit
where Uit, Rit, and Sit are, respectively, the average unit price, average regular price, and average sale price
during quarter t. The term wit is the quantity sold at a sale price divided by the total quantity sold during
the quarter. This equation simply says that average unit price is the weighted average of regular price and
sale price. We can rearrange this equation the following way:
Uit
Rit
= (1− witdit)
Here, dit ≡ Rit−SitRit is the average sale discount expressed as a percent of the regular price. Note also
that we can write wit = zitfit, where zit is the quantity response to a sale (the ratio of units sold per sale
week to units sold per week) and fit is the fraction of weeks on sale in quarter t. Thus, we have the following
expression:
1− Uit
Rit
= zitfitdit (1.5.1)
Let us call the LHS of equation 1.5.1 the realized discount. This is the amount saved from buying on
sale expressed as a percentage of regular price. The strongest form of the hypothesis that sales are a static
feature of the economy predicts that the ratio of unit price to regular price UitRit should vary little over time.
This assumes that stores do not vary their sale plans and consumers, in aggregate, do not vary their sale
purchases over time.
I compute the standard deviation of UitRit across time for each store-UPC in the sample and provide a
histogram of these values in Figure 1.5.1. About nine percent of (revenue share weighted) store-UPCs have
essentially no variation in the ratio of unit price to regular price. These products happen to be those that
are almost never on sale (Uit ≈ Rit). Most items exhibit substantial quarter to quarter variability. The
average (across store-UPCs) of the standard deviation of UitRit is 7.1 percent. This evidence is inconsistent
with the hypothesis that sales are a static feature of the economy.
Of course, it is possible that seasonal variation in sales is the primary source of the variation docu-
mented above. To see if this is the case, I repeat the analysis, but calculate the standard deviation conditional
on the quarter of the year. The variation captured in the bottom panel of Figure 1.5.1 is the variation across
time, holding the quarter of the year constant. The distribution shifts to the left a bit (versus not controlling
for seasonal variation), but only a small fraction of the variation in UitRit is due to seasonal ﬂuctuations in
sales.
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Figure 1.5.1: Time Variation in UitRit
Empirical Distribution of St.Devt
(
Uit
Rit
| i
)
Sample Statistics of St.Devt
(
Uit
Rit
| i
)
All Quarters
Average 7.1%
Median 6.5%
25th Percentile 4.0%
75th Percentile 9.8%
Observations 236,521
Empirical Distribution of St.Devt
(
Uit
Rit
| i, s
)
Sample Statistics of St.Devt
(
Uit
Rit
| i, s
)
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4
Average 7.3% 7.2% 7.1% 7.2%
Median 6.4% 6.3% 6.1% 6.4%
25th Percentile 3.7% 3.7% 3.7% 3.8%
75th Percentile 10.0% 9.9% 9.8% 9.9%
Observations 281,819 275,972 275,816 272,928
Notes: I calculate
Uit
Rit
, the average unit price divided by the average regular price, for each store-UPC i and quarter t.
Next, I compute the standard deviation of this ratio for each store-UPC, St.Devt
(
Uit
Rit
| i
)
. The graph above is a histogram
of the standard deviations with observations weighted by total revenue. The statistics to the right give the average of the
standard deviations (the sample analog of Ei
[
St.Devt
(
Uit
Rit
| i
)]
as well the 25th, 50th, and 75th percentiles. The sample
consists of store-UPC cells with observations for all 24 quarters and each quarter must have at least 7 weeks of
observations. I exclude products that had no sales. In the bottom panel, I compute the standard deviation conditional on
the quarter of the year, s. Thus, I compute four standard deviations for each store-UPC, one for each quarter.
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Table 1.5: Sale Variance Decomposition
Source of Variation Mean Median(
1
σ2RDi
)
V art (ln zit) 18.7% 7.2%(
1
σ2RDi
)
V ar (ln fit) 44.3% 28.0%(
1
σ2RDi
)
V ar (ln dit) 23.9% 20.8%(
1
σ2RDi
)
2
∑
i 6=j
σij 13.1% 24.0%
Notes: I decomposeσ2RDi
≡ V ar
[
ln
(
1− UitRit
)]
for each UPC-store with data in
all 24 quarters and at least one sale. I present each term as a percent of σ2RDi
.
The sources of variation are: zit(average units sold per sale week relative to all
weeks), dit (average discount versus regular price), and fit (the fraction of weeks
on sale in quarter t). I present both the mean and median (across the
UPC-stores). A few outliers cause large diﬀerences between the mean and median.
I now turn to a description of how the characteristics of sales vary over time. The log of the realized
discount is additive in the logs of zit, fit, and dit. Thus, we can decompose variation in the log of the realized
discount into variation in the logs of zit, fit , and dit, plus a covariance term:
σ2lnRDi = σ
2
ln zi + σ
2
ln fi + σ
2
ln di + covariances (1.5.2)
This allows us to see whether variation in UitRit is the result of ﬁrm decisions (variation in fit and dit) or
shopper behavior (variation in zit). In Table 1.5, I report mean and median standard deviations expressed
as a percent of σ2lnRDi ≡ V art
[
ln
(
1− UitRit
)
|i
]
. About two thirds of the variation in the realized discount
comes from changes in the frequency and depth of sales.
We have not ruled out the possibility that sales are negatively correlated across products within a
quarter, which would result in relatively low aggregate variation in sales. To see if this is the case, I calculate
the mean and median of UitRit , zit, fit, and dit (across store-UPCs) for each quarter. I plot the results in ﬁgure
1.5.2.
Unit price relative to regular price exhibits a substantial decline over the course of 2002, after which, it
remains fairly constant with some seasonal ﬂuctuation. The cause of this change is evidently a large increase
in the frequency of sales that occurred over the same time period. In the third quarter of 2003, the median
frequency of sales shifted up from twice per quarter to three times per quarter. The average frequency of
sales continues to trend upward for the rest of the sample, but the eﬀect on unit price is oﬀset by a steady
decline in the quantity response to sales and the average discount.
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Figure 1.5.2: The Characteristics of Sales Over Time
Panel A:
Uit
Rit
Panel B: fit
Panel C: dit Panel D: zit
Panel A: Revenue weighted mean and median of
Uit
Rit
, average unit price divided by average regular price for item i in
quarter t. Panel B: Revenue weighted mean and median of fit, the fraction of weeks item i is on sale during quarter t.
Panel C: Mean and median of dit =
Rit−Sit
Rit
, the average percent discount as a percent of regular price, conditional on at
least one sale. Panel D: Mean and Median of the quantity response, zit which is the average units sold on sale relative to
average units sold in all weeks.
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Sales and Aggregate Price
In this subsection, we will study the impact of sales on the price level by comparing an index of regular
price to an index of average unit price. By doing so, we will see how changes in sales and regular price aﬀect
average price paid over time.
Price Index Construction
In order to construct indexes of regular price and unit price, I employ the same approach used by the BLS to
calculate the consumer price index with one important diﬀerence. The BLS samples a single price quote each
month. I have weekly price and quantity data and wish to make use of this extra information. Therefore, I
take an average of all prices within a month rather than randomly selecting a single price.
For the index of regular price, I take a simple average of regular price for the month (usually there
are 4 and they are often all the same). For the index of unit price, I take total revenue divided by units sold
to get the average price paid. I then use these monthly average prices the same way the BLS uses a sampled
price. Speciﬁcally, I calculate a price relative for each month (ratio of current price to last month's price)
and then aggregated using a ﬁxed weight geometric average. The details are explained in the appendix.
Figure 1.5.3 plots the two indexes for each of the markets in the sample. Both of the indexes begin
with a base value of one in February of 2001.9 The two indexes usually track each other closely but there
are several examples in which they diverge substantially for several years. Gaps between the regular price
and the unit price can be attributed entirely to changes in one or more of the characteristics of sales.10 The
results in section 4.1, and in particular, the graphs in Figure 1.5.1, indicate that we should expect to see
regular price and unit price deviate from each other beginning in 2002. San Francisco and Seattle are the
clearest examples of this phenomenon.
Explaining Unit Price Volatility
As the graphs in Figure 1.5.3 indicate, unit price is substantially more volatile than regular price. The
standard deviation of the log change of unit price is two to four times that of regular price (see Table 1.5.3).
Changes in regular price only explain a fraction of the variation in unit price.
As a descriptive exercise, I project the log diﬀerence of the unit price index, rut , onto the log change of
the regular price index rrt and a vector of monthly dummies mt to capture seasonal variation in unit price:
rut = mtλ+ α1r
r
t + et (1.5.3)
9The ﬁrst month is dropped due to diﬃculties in identifying sales and regular price in the ﬁrst four weeks of the sample.
10The Appendix contains a technical explanation for why this is the case.
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Table 1.6: OLS Projection: rut = mtλ+ α1r
r
t + et
Weekly Frequency (t indexes weeks)
α1 R-Squared σUnit Price σReg Price
New York 0.42 0.19 1.1% 0.2%
Los Angeles 0.39 0.20 1.1% 0.2%
San Francisco 0.58 0.36 1.8% 0.3%
Dallas 0.36 0.16 1.0% 0.3%
Houston 0.35 0.15 0.9% 0.2%
All Markets 0.54 0.33 0.7% 0.1%
Monthly Frequency (t indexes months).
α1 R-Squared σUnit Price σReg Price
New York 0.16 0.31 1.1% 0.3%
Los Angeles 0.33 0.39 1.2% 0.4%
San Francisco 0.36 0.51 1.7% 0.5%
Dallas 0.40 0.39 1.1% 0.6%
Houston 0.41 0.44 1.0% 0.4%
All Markets 0.51 0.44 0.8% 0.2%
Notes: The top panel uses the log change in a weekly price index and the bottom panel uses log change in a monthly
price index. Each row contains the coeﬃcient estimates from an OLS projection of the log diﬀerence of unit price
(rut ) on the log diﬀerence of regular price (r
r
t ) and a vector of month dummies (mt). Each market is estimated
separately (listed in Column 1). Both rut and r
r
t are standardized (demeaned and divided by the standard deviation)
prior to the estimation.
The purpose of estimating equation 1.5.3 is to see how much of the variation in rut is explained by
seasonal variation (captured by the term mtλ) and variation in r
r
t . In Table 1.6 I provide the OLS estimates
of Equation 1.5.3 using weekly and monthly frequencies. The R-squared statistics indicate that between ten
and thirty percent of the week-to-week change in aggregate price can be explained by changes in regular
price and seasonal variation in sales. Aggregating up to a monthly index increases the explanatory power of
regular price but leaves over half of the variation in unit price unaccounted for. Non-seasonal ﬂuctuations
in sales (frequency, size, and quantity ratio) explain half or more of the variation in unit price.
The reader may wonder how much of the volatility in unit price disappears if the aggregation period
is increased from a month to a quarter. I construct the indexes described above taking quarterly averages of
unit price and regular price instead of monthly averages. The results are reported in Table 1.7. Averaging
across quarters smooths things out considerably, but non-seasonal variation in sales still accounts for 35 to
50 percent of the quarter-to-quarter variation in unit price.
Sales and Aggregate Price Adjustment
I now compare the two indexes to the (corresponding components of the) CPI-U. I construct the relevant
CPI by gathering item indexes from the BLS that correspond to each of the IRI categories. I then average
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Table 1.7: Quarterly OLS Projection: rut = qtλ+ α1r
r
t + et
α1 R-Squared σUnit Price σReg Price
New York 0.31 0.71 1.2% 0.4%
Los Angeles 0.55 0.49 1.5% 0.7%
San Francisco 0.34 0.50 1.5% 0.6%
Dallas 0.80 0.66 1.2% 0.8%
Houston 0.87 0.73 1.4% 0.8%
All Markets 0.80 0.66 0.6% 0.4%
Notes: Each row contains the coeﬃcient estimates from an OLS projection of the log diﬀerence of unit price (rut ) on
the log diﬀerence of regular price (rrt ) and quarterly dummy variables (qt). Each market is estimated separately
(listed in Column 1). All variables are all standardized (demeaned and divided by the standard deviation) prior to
the estimation.
across these item indexes using the same weights that I use to aggregate across the IRI categories (revenue
share). For the IRI indexes, I include all 50 markets and aggregate across markets using the same weights
used by the BLS to construct the CPI-U. I plot all three indexes in ﬁgure 1.5.4 to see how they compare.11
The CPI, the regular price index, and the unit price index all track each other fairly closely for the
ﬁrst four quarters of the sample, and then diverge for several years.12 Regular price behaves much more like
the CPI than does unit price. The correlation between the CPI and the regular price index is 0.90 while the
correlation between the CPI and the unit price index is 0.60. This is to be expected because the CPI uses
ﬁxed weights so it does not fully capture the eﬀect of changes in sales on unit price.13 In section 1.5 we
found that there was a large increase in the frequency of sales that began in the third quarter of 2001.
The most striking feature of ﬁgure 1.5.4 is that unit price falls well below the regular price index
(and the CPI) early in the sample period. The gap between regular price and unit price grows to about one
percentage point over the ﬁrst 12 months and then grows to more than three percentage points by the end
of 2002.
In the middle panel of ﬁgure 1.5.4, I plot the gap between regular price and unit price along with
the unemployment rate. Vertical gray bars highlight business cycle contractions (peak to trough) as deﬁned
by the NBER. Following the contraction of 2001, average unit price fell relative to regular price by about
three percentage points. This change is fairly persistent. By the end of 2006, the gap between unit price
and regular price remained two percentage points higher than it was at the beginning of 2001.
11Details of this calculation can be found in the Appendix
12
The indexes I calculate will deviate from the CPI for two main reasons other than the fact that I use weekly data. First, I
do not deal with new product substitutions as the CPI does because I only include products that were available in all sample
periods (though the results are robust to relaxing this requirement). Second, the CPI includes far more outlets than I include
in this sample (eg Mass Merchandisers).
13For a full discussion of why the CPI under reports the eﬀect of changes in the features of sales, see Appendix B.
21
Figure 1.5.4: Index Comparison: CPI vs. Regular Price vs. Unit Price
IRI Sample DFF Sample
CPI, Regular Price Index, Unit Price Index Regular Price Index Unit Price Index
Index Gap: Regular Price - Unit Price
Fraction of Revenue From Sales
Panel A plots quarterly indexes of unit price and regular price over the full sample (left side is the IRI sample and
the right side is the DFF sample). The CPI for comparable items is also included on the IRI chart for comparison.
Panel B plots the diﬀerence between the two indexes over time. The initial month is equal to zero in both cases
because of the way the indexes were calculated. Panel C plots the fraction of revenue from sales for each of the
samples. Vertical lines indicate NBER contraction dates.
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In the DFF data, the gap between unit price and regular price is much more volatile. This is probably
due to changes in the environment that are speciﬁc to DFF. For instance, in Chapter 3 I show that DFF
appears to have responded to the entry of Wal-Mart by having more frequent sales. Nevertheless, we do see
a four percentage point increase in the diﬀerence between regular price and unit price during the recession
of 1991. This change is almost entirely reversed within 5 quarters.
With such short sample periods, I am unable to make strong statements about the role of sales in
aggregate price adjustment. However, this evidence suggests that average unit price exhibits larger and faster
responses to downward pressure on prices. In the ﬁgures above, we observe two occasions during which there
would have been downward pressure on prices (coming from the demand side) and in both cases, unit price
fell relative to regular price. However, diﬀerences in the timing of these changes relative to contraction dates
leaves us with an unclear picture of the role that sales play in aggregate price adjustment.
1.6 Store Response to Reductions in Revenue
In this section, I investigate whether stores use sales to respond to changes in residual demand. The concept
of residual demand I have in mind for a grocery store is a vector of functions (one for each product oﬀered)
that maps the set of price plans into quantities sold. Events that would cause this mapping to shift include
the entry of a competitor, changes in another store's price plan, and changes in the incomes of regular
shoppers, just to name a few. I would like to determine whether large shifts in this mapping result in
changes to the frequency and size of sales. Unfortunately, I have little hope of estimating such a system of
equations (given the available data) so I'll have to come up with an alternative approach.
In the IRI sample, there are several instances in which grocery stores faced large reductions in revenue
over a short period of time. I am unable to identify the causes of large revenue changes because very little
is known about the stores.14 I assume that sudden and large changes in revenue are due to shifts in demand
and test whether ﬁrms respond with changes to the frequency and/or size of sales. My assumption seems
reasonable because I ﬁnd that stores tend to increase the frequency of sales following a large reduction in
revenue.
Data
For this analysis, I use data from all chains with balanced panels for all six years in the data. Previous
literature (mentioned by EJR) establishes that store level pricing is largely controlled at the chain level and
I assume that a chain's price plan would be market speciﬁc, so I aggregate the data into a panel of 132
14IRI's vendors required conﬁdentiality in order to make the data available for academic research
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Figure 1.6.1: Demand Shock Identiﬁcation Example from the Data
Negative Demand Shock Example Positive Shock Followed by Negative Shock
Notes: The graphs above indicate actual examples from the data of (a) a store that appears to have experienced a large
negative demand shock, and (b) a store that experienced a large positive demand shock followed by a negative demand
shock. The red lines indicate how I identify the timing of changes in the binary demand shock variables used in the
regressions.
market-chains (e.g. Chain1-Chicago). The week-to-week and month-to-month variation in all of the relevant
variables is quite large so I aggregate to the quarter level in order to reduce measurement error caused by
holiday shopping weeks that overlap months (e.g. Fourth of July, Labor Day, and Thanksgiving).
Demand Shock Identiﬁcation
My objective is to ﬁnd large and persistent (non-seasonal) shifts in revenue. I compute a two quarter moving
average of revenue to smooth out transitory ﬂuctuations. I consider a demand shock to have occurred in the
quarter prior to a 10% year-over-year drop in the moving average of revenue. I apply a symmetric approach
to identify positive demand shocks.
I construct an indicator variable for each of two shock types. Negit (Posit) takes a value of zero prior
to the occurrence of a negative (positive) demand shock and then takes a value of one in the quarter in which
the shock occurs and every quarter after, unless a shock in the opposite direction occurs later. Figure 1.6.1
provides two actual examples from the data to illustrate how the binary shock variables are determined.
Using the procedure described above, I ﬁnd that 70 of the 124 chains in the data experience negative
demand shocks at some point during the sample period. These shocks occur over the course of 16 quarters.
The quarter with the most shocks is the fourth quarter of 2001 with 17 chains experiencing negative demand
shocks in this quarter. These 17 chains are not concentrated in a single market. The remaining 53 negative
demand shocks are spread out more or less evenly over time. I conclude that these sudden drops in revenue
are not due to large changes in marginal costs.
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Estimation
My objective is to evaluate whether demand shocks result in changes to sales (temporary price reductions).
To do this, I use the ﬁxed eﬀects panel estimator and test several diﬀerent model speciﬁcations. The ﬁrst
two speciﬁcations use a pre/post shock indicator variable to estimate eﬀect of a sudden change in revenue
on sales. They are both essentially panel diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences estimators. The third speciﬁcation uses a
continuous measure of the state of demand facing the chain.
With each speciﬁcation, I consider three diﬀerent measures of sales as the dependent variable. The
ﬁrst is realized discount (RealDiscit) which is the percentage diﬀerence between revenue at regular price and
actual revenue (and described at length in section 1.5). Realized discount combines all three characteristics
of sales (frequency, size, and quantity ratio). The second dependent variable I consider is the fraction of items
on sale (fracit). This is the revenue weighted average fraction of UPC-weeks on sale. The ﬁnal dependent
variable I consider is the fraction of revenue from sales (SaleRevFracit).
In the ﬁrst speciﬁcation, the demand shocks are captured by the binary variables Negit and Posit. I
estimate the following equation:
yit = λt + δnNegit + δpPosit + ci + eit (1.6.1)
where yt is one of the three dependent variables described above, λt controls for aggregate time eﬀects (by
including a dummy for each quarter), ci is the unobserved (chain speciﬁc) eﬀect, and eit is idiosyncratic error.
The ﬁxed eﬀects estimator is consistent under any correlation structure between ci and the other covariates,
assuming eit is strictly exogenous. The purpose of deﬁning the shock variable as binary is to minimize the
possibility that it is correlated with unexplained changes in sales behavior (eit). I report estimates of δp and
δn (the eﬀect of positive and negative demand shocks) along with other relevant estimation results in table
1.8.
Other Speciﬁcations
As a robustness check, I estimate a second speciﬁcation (for each of the three dependent variables described
above) which allows for individual speciﬁc time trends:
∆yit = gi + ηt + δn∆Negit + δp∆Posit + ∆eit (1.6.2)
In this speciﬁcation, gi is the individual time trend and ηt captures aggregate time eﬀects (via a vector of
quarter dummies). The estimates from this speciﬁcation are more precise and broadly consistent with the
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original speciﬁcation.
For the ﬁnal speciﬁcation, I abandon the binary classiﬁcation of shocks. Instead, I use a one quarter
lag of the year over year log change in two quarter moving average revenue. To allow for asymmetric eﬀects,
I separate this variable into two: one containing positive values and one containing negative values (they
are zero otherwise and sum to the total). The advantage of this speciﬁcation is that it does not require an
arbitrary cutoﬀ for determining demand shocks. The equation is the same as 1.6.1 but the shock variables
are deﬁned as described above.
The results indicate that realized discount responds to negative demand shocks. Following a 10
percent or larger decline in revenue, grocery chains increased the fraction of items on sale by an average of
2.3 percentage points. The fraction of reveue from sale increased by an average of 4.9 percentage points and
the realized discount increased by an average of 1.2 percentage points. It is not clear whether the eﬀect is
symmetric or not. Speciﬁcation 1 ﬁnds no eﬀect of a positive demand shock on measures of sales. On the
other hand, speciﬁcations 2 and 3 indicate that there is. This evidence suggests that multiproduct retailers
use sales to respond to chain-wide demand shocks. In Chapter 3, I show that DFF increased the fraction of
items on sale following the entry of Wal-Mart.
Impulse Response Functions
Another way to describe the dynamics of revenue and sales is to estimate a system of equations using
Vector Autoregression. For this exercise, I consider three endogenous variables: ∆ lnUnitPrice = rut ,
∆ lnRegPrice = rrt , and ∆ ln(Revenue). The model I have in mind is one in which the steady state is
characterized by constant revenue growth and a constant ratio of unit price to regular price. One way
to respond to a demand shock is to change the regular price (and hold the unit price/regular price ratio
constant). Another way would be to adjust the frequency and/or size of sales while leaving the regular price
unchanged. To see what grocery chains actually do, I estimate the following VAR model and present the
impulse response functions (IRFs).
yt =
p∑
l=1
Alyt−l + et
yt ≡

∆ lnRev
rrt
rut

To estimate the model, I stack the panels (24 quarters of data for each of 100 grocery chains) into
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Figure 1.6.2: Impulse Response Functions: Revenue, and Unit Price
Cumulative Response of ru to∆ lnRev Cumulative Response of rr to ∆ lnRev
Notes: The ﬁgures above plot the response of RealDisc and ∆ lnRev to an orthogonalized impulse to ∆ lnRev. The
Cholesky ordering is rr, ru ∆ lnRev.
a single time series. The idea is to treat each panel as a sample taken at intervals in time separated by
several quarters (so that lags don't overlap diﬀerent panels). I include time dummies as exogenous variables
to control for nationwide cost shifts and seasonal ﬂuctuations. I also include a vector of chain dummies to
control for chain speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀects. Lag length of seven quarters provides the best ﬁt according to the
SBIC.15
Figure 1.6.2 displays the cumulative response of the growth rates of unit price and regular price
to an orthogonalized impulse to revenue growth. The Cholesky ordering of the endogenous variables is
rrt , r
u
t , ∆ lnRevt. In other words, I assume that neither regular price nor unit price respond to contempo-
raneous revenue growth shocks.
Looking at the IRFs, we can see that the contemporaneous eﬀect of a revenue growth shock on unit
price is to reduce it. This is because the contemporaneous correlation of the error terms is negative. In the
following four quarters, unit price rises while regular price is mostly ﬂat. That is, unit price rises after a
positive shock to demand, but regular price does not. After about four quarters, regular price rises slightly
(though not signiﬁcantly) and unit price falls slightly. In the long run, the ratio of unit price to regular price
returns to its original level. This pattern suggests that grocery chains adjust the frequency and size of sales
as an early response to demand shocks.
15Both the HQIC and the SBIC agree that 6 lags is the best ﬁt for the model. However, the AIC and BIC select a lag length
of 11 quarters. Since each panel is only 23 quarters, I go with the shorter lag length. The results using either are qualitatively
the same.
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1.7 Synchronization of Sales
In this section I investigate the extent to which sales are synchronized. In the spirit of Nakamura (2008),
we may be able to tell something about why sales typically occur by investigating the extent to which they
are synchronized.16 My results are consistent with Nakamura's and also Chevalier and Kashyap (2011) who
ﬁnd that sales are mainly retailer-product speciﬁc events that are staggered across stores and items.
This is important because many of the menu cost models referenced thus far model sales in a way
that would imply synchronization.17 In these models, sales are an inexpensive alternative for ﬁrms to react
to large deviations between the frictionless optimal price and the inherited price. In Kehoe and Midrigan
(2010), ﬁrms have a sale when a large enough gap opens between the inherited price and the frictionless
price. Similarly, ﬁrms in Eichenbaum et al. (2011) can switch between two inherited prices for free or pay the
menu cost to chose a diﬀerent price plan. In either case, most of the week-to-week volatility in an individual
price series results from large, temporary, idiosyncratic cost shocks.
Several papers have noted that sales on speciﬁc products tend to occur when demand for them is
predictably high, not low (Chevalier et al., 2003; Warner and Barsky, 1995; DeGraba, 2006). The explanations
for this phenomenon typically involve strategic behavior between competing sellers or between buyers and
sellers. Second, if a sale is due to a temporary drop in marginal cost, then we should observe synchronization
in the timing of sales. Below I explain why product speciﬁc cost/demand shocks would result in three
types of synchronization: 1) across stores for a particular product and 2) across products for a particular
manufacturer, and 3) across close substitutes within a store.
Across Store Synchronization
Most products (deﬁned as a UPC) are sold at several diﬀerent stores. A large portion of the marginal cost
of retail goods is the acquisition price, which is more or less common to all retailers. Thus, one would expect
that if a product is on sale in one store because of a temporary reduction in the wholesale price, then it
ought to be on sale at several other stores for the same reason.
To measure this type of synchronization, I calculate the fraction of stores having a sale on product
j in each week t ( fracj,t). I only consider UPC's that are sold in at least one third of the stores in the
sample. Table 1.9 contains the 25th percentile, median, and 75th percentile of fracj,t conditional on it being
16Nakamura (2008) decomposes retail price variation in order to see how much can plausibly be explained by wholesale price
changes. She ﬁnds that only a small portion of retail price variation appears to be due to changes in acquisition price.
17My interpretation of these models is that each commodity produced in the economy corresponds to a UPC (rather than
a store-UPC). Thus, cost shocks that get passed through to price should occur simultaneously across many locations. If the
correct interpretation is that a commodity corresponds to a store-UPC, then it is hard to imagine what would cause large,
transitory, and frequent cost shocks that are speciﬁc to an item within a store.
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larger than zero, for each category. If sales were perfectly synchronized, then the fraction of stores having a
sale should be either 0 or 1. If sales are perfectly staggered then the fraction of stores holding a sale would
always be equal to the probability of a sale. To get a clearer picture of synchronization across stores, I also
provide histograms of fracj,t in Figure 1.7.1.
Some amount of synchronization is evident, particularly for carbonated beverages where it is not
uncommon for a single product to be on sale in at least 40% of stores. However, it is extremely rare to
ﬁnd that a product is on sale in more than half of stores, regardless of the category. It is almost never the
case that a single item is on sale in 75% or more of the stores. There is evidence that stores tend to put
products on sale in the week following manufacturer coupon drops (Nevo and Wolfram, 2002) but this type
of synchronization has little to do with idiosyncratic demand and supply shocks.
Across Product within Manufacturer Synchronization
Marginal cost driven sales should also result in synchronization across products from a particular manu-
facturer. The marginal cost of producing diﬀerent sizes, ﬂavors, scents, etc. of the same brand should be
highly correlated. I measure synchronization within manufacturer by calculating the fraction of items on
sale within each vendor-store-week combination. From the set of vendor-store-week combinations, I keep
only those which contain at least 5 diﬀerent items, one of which was on sale. I report the median of this
measure for each category in 1.9.
For some of the categories, a certain amount of synchronization within a manufacturer is evident.
This may be due to the fact that manufacturers often arrange for a coordinated promotional events of
several items in their lineup. Without cost data from a manufacturer, we cannot distinguish between the
two explanations. These results do not support the idea that sales are the result of temporary reductions in
the marginal cost of production.18
Across Products within Store-Category Synchronization
The ﬁnal type of synchronization I check for is within a category-store. If sales are responses to demand
and/or supply shocks, then we should see some synchronization of sales across close substitutes. Since these
models do not distinguish between purchase and consumption, a low price should induce lower prices for
close substitutes.
I ﬁnd that sales tend to be staggered across products within a store-category. The fraction of items
on sale in a given store-category-week is usually below 25% and almost never above 40%. This result is
18It may be that sales are the result of temporary reductions in the wholesale price of items sold by grocery stores. However,
US anti-trust law discourages manufacturers from charging their customers diﬀerent prices.
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consistent with Chevalier and Kashyap (2011) and Lal (1990). The literature has noted exceptions to this
phenomenon during weeks of predictably high demand such as eggs in the week before Easter, and tuna
during Lent (Hosken and Reiﬀen, 2004; Chevalier et al., 2003). But these exceptions work in the opposite
direction that standard models predict.
1.8 Concluding Discussion
In the analysis above, I provide evidence that sales have a large inﬂuence on the average price paid and the
rate at which it changes over time. Existing macro studies of sales emphasize the stickiness of regular price.
I have shown that indexes of unit price and regular price can diverge substantially (up to 4 index points)
and persistently.
Sales are generally staggered (not synchronized) across stores and products. This fact along with
evidence from other work indicates that modeling sales as the result of large, transient, and idiosyncratic
cost shocks probably misses the true motivation for most sales. Alternative motivations for sales such as
strategic behavior (Guimaraes and Sheedy, 2011) or inventory management (Aguirregabiria, 1999; Campbell
and Eden, 2005; Eden and Jaremski, 2010) seem to be a more promising route for modeling sales in the
macro economy. This distinction may be important because there appears to be cyclical variation in the
amount shoppers save by buying on sale. At this stage it seems premature for macro economists to ignore
sales.
I have also shown that the CPI is less volatile than an index of unit price. One task often fulﬁlled
by the CPI is to deﬂate nominal magnitudes into real magnitudes. Recommending changes to the CPI
methodology falls well beyond the scope of this paper, but my results raise two important questions.19 Does
the CPI do a reasonable job of deﬂating nominal magnitudes into real magnitudes? and 2) How accurately
are we measuring inﬂation over the course of the business cycle? The characteristics of sales change over
time and tend to aﬀect average unit price much more so than the CPI reﬂects. At a minimum, these results
suggest that we consider carefully the ways in which we use the CPI.
19For a lengthy discussion of scanner data and the CPI, see the book that contains the article by Feenstra and Shapiro (2003).
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APPENDIX
1.A Regular Price Filter and Sale Deﬁnition Details
I use my own regular price ﬁlter because most of the other ﬁlters used in the literature miss certain types
of sale episodes. The simple algorithms used in the literature that analyzes monthly BLS data do not work
well when applied to weekly data because sales often last for several weeks during which the price changes.
EJR and KM work with concepts similar to regular price. However, both of the algorithms used
in these papers often classify (what retailers and shoppers would consider) a sale price as the reference
price or the list price when a sale price is the most frequently observed price over certain intervals. EJR
simply deﬁne the reference price as the modal price for the quarter. KM use a more complicated algorithm
for determining the list price that does not restrict the frequency with which such a price can change.
However, I ﬁnd that this algorithm will also select what appears to be the sale price as the list price. I
wish to emphasize that neither EJR nor KM claim to be identifying the regular price as I have deﬁned it
above.
To get an idea of the diﬀerence between the two ﬁlters, I redo table 1.4 using the Kehoe-Midrigan
ﬁlter to identify the regular price. The results are presented in Table 1.10. In general, the Kehoe-Midrigan
price ﬁlter tends to ﬁnd fewer sales than the regular price ﬁlter that I use.
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Table 1.10: Sales Using Kehoe-Midrigan Regular Price Filter
Category Sales Fraction of Total
Median
Discount
Median
Quantity
Ratio
Weeks Revenue Units
Carbonated Beverages 20.2% 38.9% 38.6% 20.6% 1.8
Milk 15.2% 15.2% 16.6% 14.9% 1.3
Beer 13.9% 29.7% 25.0% 11.3% 1.7
Cold Cereal 17.1% 32.7% 41.6% 29.1% 2.6
Salty Snacks 19.2% 29.8% 32.1% 20.2% 1.7
Cigarettes 8.2% 9.0% 8.0% 12.5% 2.1
Frozen Dinners 22.7% 37.7% 41.2% 25.4% 2.2
Yogurt 21.3% 27.9% 37.7% 22.6% 1.8
Toilet Tissue 19.3% 39.8% 34.6% 23.1% 2.3
Laundry Detergent 15.9% 34.3% 42.7% 23.1% 2.7
Soup 14.1% 28.4% 33.9% 26.7% 2.6
Frozen Pizza 22.5% 36.8% 41.8% 22.2% 2.2
Coﬀee 13.4% 30.0% 36.6% 19.3% 2.5
Paper Towels 16.6% 37.2% 31.2% 21.9% 2.0
Hot dogs 22.7% 35.8% 45.0% 28.8% 2.2
Spaghetti Sauce 16.2% 30.4% 37.3% 22.2% 2.5
Diapers 14.9% 24.3% 26.7% 15.0% 2.5
Margarine and Butter 16.4% 22.1% 27.6% 21.5% 1.6
Mayonnaise 12.7% 27.3% 30.8% 20.8% 1.8
Facial Tissue 20.3% 30.7% 35.5% 23.1% 1.7
Toothpaste 14.2% 29.5% 35.3% 22.2% 2.7
Shampoos 13.3% 26.2% 31.6% 22.3% 3.3
Peanut Butter 13.9% 23.6% 32.5% 19.1% 1.9
Mustard and Ketchup 9.9% 21.8% 27.6% 18.3% 2.2
Deodorant 11.3% 23.5% 28.8% 24.9% 3.2
Blades 10.8% 16.1% 20.9% 20.2% 2.4
Household Cleaners 14.3% 22.9% 27.3% 18.5% 1.9
Toothbrushes 13.3% 27.2% 31.5% 24.6% 3.0
Sugar Substitutes 7.6% 10.4% 11.8% 11.9% 1.7
Photo Supplies 9.8% 21.3% 23.0% 21.0% 2.8
Razors 13.1% 29.2% 30.2% 16.2% 3.2
All Categories 16.2% 28.9% 33.3%
Notes: This table is the same as Table 1.4 but it uses the Kehoe-Midrigan regular price ﬁlter to
determine regular price. A sale is any price that is at least 5% below the regular price. These summary
statistics aggregate across all of the markets listed in Table 1.1.
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1.B Price Index Discussion
The point of this appendix is to show how the CPI does not fully reﬂect changes in unit price due to changes
in sales. I begin with a brief description of how the BLS computes the CPI. In the simplest terms, the
BLS collects a sample of prices each month and then aggregates them in two steps. The ﬁrst step takes
sampled prices and aggregates them into basic indexes which are speciﬁc to an item and a geographic area.
An example of a basic index is salad dressing in Chicago-Gary-Kenosha. The second step of aggregation is
to take averages of subsets of the basic indexes to form the various price indexes published by the BLS (for
example, the CPI-U).
We focus on how sampled prices are aggregated into a basic index (the stage at which quantity sold
could be incorporated). First, the BLS chooses several store-items whose prices will be recorded on a monthly
basis. A 20 oz. box of Cheerios from the Dominick's Finer Foods on Lincoln Ave. is an example of a store-
item. These prices are then aggregated into a price relative for each area-item-month. An area-item price
relative is (in most cases) the expenditure share weighted geometric average of the ratio of adjacent period
prices. The formula for a price relative of item i in area a between months t and t− 1 is presented in (1.B.1)
below. A basic index for period T is then formed by chaining the price relatives between the base period
and period T .
a,iR[t,t−1] =
∏
j∈{a×i}
(
Pj,t
Pj,t−1
)wj
(1.B.1)
The point I wish to emphasize is that the weights wi are not adjusted to reﬂect the fraction of
transactions that occurred at price Pj,t. This means that adjustments in average unit price due to high
frequency substitution are not reﬂected in the CPI. Since a price index is primarily used to measure the
change in the price level, ﬁxing weights is not an issue if the characteristics of sales are static. However, if
the characteristics of sales change over time, then it is unclear that a ﬁxed weight geometric average will
accurately reﬂect changes in the price level due to sales.
The following numerical example will help to illustrate this point. Let us suppose that instead of
sampling a single price per month for a particular store-item, we are able to collect price and quantity data
for each of 4 weeks in the month. This additional data will require another level of aggregation (assuming we
wish to apply the same basic approach that the BLS currently takes). There are many possible approaches
to aggregating scanner data into price indexes and this topic is addressed thoroughly in Feenstra and Shapiro
(2003) and the citations therein.
For this example, I simply wish to highlight the eﬀect of changes in the characteristics of sales on
average price paid. I compare the growth rates of average menu price and average unit price under three
38
Table 1.11: Numerical Example of Change in Simple Average vs. Weighted Average
Panel A Panel B Panel C
Change in Frequency Change in Size Change in Importance
Price Mo. 1 Mo. 2 Mo. 3 Mo. 1 Mo. 2 Mo. 3 Mo. 1 Mo. 2 Mo. 3
Week 1 .90 .90 1.00 .90 .80 .90 .90 .90 .90
Week 2 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Week 3 1.00 .90 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Week 4 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Quantity Sold
Week 1 240 133 240 240 240 240 240 342 240
Week 2 120 67 120 120 120 120 120 86 120
Week 3 120 133 120 120 120 120 120 86 120
Week 4 120 67 120 120 120 120 120 86 120
Frequency of Sales 25% 50% 25% 25% 25% 25% 25% 25% 25%
Size of Sales 10% 10% 10% 10% 20% 10% 10% 10% 10%
Quantity Ratio 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 4.0 2.0
Average menu price 0.98 0.95 0.98 0.98 0.95 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.98
Inﬂation (monthly) -2.6% 2.6% -2.6% 2.6% 0.0% 0.0%
Average unit price 0.96 0.93 0.96 0.96 0.92 0.96 0.96 0.94 0.96
Inﬂation (monthly) -2.8% 2.9% -4.2% 4.3% -1.8% 1.6%
Diﬀerence -0.2% 0.2% -1.6% 1.7% -1.8% 1.8%
diﬀerent scenarios in which one of the characteristics of sales changes while the other two are ﬁxed. The
results presented in Table 1.11 show that an index of average menu price and average unit price diﬀer when
any of the following three characteristics of sales changes:
1. Frequency (measured by fraction of items on sale per week)
2. Size (percentage discount oﬀ of the regular price)
3. Quantity Ratio (quantity sold per sale relative to quantity sold per regular price).
The index of average menu price understates the change in average unit price. In practice, an increase in
the average discount would likely correspond to an increase in the quantity ratio. The eﬀects of these two
changes together would drive an even larger gap between the unit price and the menu price. On the other
hand, an increase in the frequency of sales may reduce the quantity ratio and the eﬀects would oﬀset each
other.
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1.C Index Construction: Average Unit Price and Average Regular Price
To analyze the importance of sales on the dynamics of prices, I calculate two diﬀerent price indexes using
the scanner data. The only diﬀerence between these two indexes occurs in the aggregation across weeks
within a store-product-month cell. The equations that follow show how I construct the average price for
each store-product-month. Denote the average price of UPC j in month t as Pj,t with a superscript to denote
the two diﬀerent averages: r and u indicating regular, and unit respectively:
Average regular price:
P rjt =
1
njt
∑
w∈t
prjw (1.C.1)
Average unit price:
Pujt =
1
qjt
∑
w∈t
qjw∗pjw (1.C.2)
where w indexes the week, njt is the total number of price observations for UPC j in month t (usually the
number of weeks in the month), and qjw is the quantity sold during week w. In simple terms, the average
regular price is the simple average of regular price and the average unit price is revenue divided by quantity
sold.
Since we have several thousand UPCs in our sample, we need to aggregate across products into a
single price index. To do so, I use the same technique as the BLS, which is to take the geometric average
of monthly price relatives (using the UPC's average share of revenue as the weight). Importantly, I use the
same aggregation procedure for both price indexes. The month t price index with base period 0 is:
I0,t−1 = exp
∑
j
wj ln
Pj,t
Pj,0
 (1.C.3)
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1.D CPI Construction Details
I calculate a comparable index from the components of the CPI. Speciﬁcally, I aggregate the CPI item
indexes that correspond to the product categories contained in the scanner data sample. Table 1.12 shows
the CPI Item series used and the corresponding weights (which are the same as those used to aggregate the
scanner data). Table 1.13 shows the weights I apply to each of the markets contained in the IRI scanner
data sample.
Table 1.12: CPI Item Indexes and Corresponding IRI Scanner Data Categories
Series ID Description Weight IRI Category(s)
CUUR0000SEFA02 Breakfast Cereal 0.11 coldcer
CUUR0000SS05011 Frankfurters 0.03 hotdogs
CUUR0000SEFN01 Carbonated Beverages 0.18 carbbev
CUUR0000SEFP01 Coﬀee 0.04 coﬀee
CUUR0000SEFR01 Sugar & Sweetners 0.01 sugarsub
CUUR0000SEFS01 Butter & Margarine 0.02 margbutr
CUUR0000SS16014 Peanut Butter 0.01 peanbutr
CUUR0000SEFT01 Soups 0.05 soup
CUUR0000SEFT02 Frozen and Prepared Foods 0.11 fzdinent, fzpizza
CUUR0000SEFT03 Snacks 0.11 saltsnck
CUUR0000SEFT04 Spices Seasoning Condiments 0.06 spagsauc, mayo, mustket
CUUR0000SEFW01 Beer 0.14 beer
CUUR0000SS61021 Photo Supplies 0.00 photo
CUUR0000SEGB01 Hair Dental Shaving 0.06 toothpaste, shamp, deod, blades, toothbr
CUUR0000SSGE013 Infants Equipment 0.02 diapers
CUUR0000SEFJ04 Other Dairy 0.06 yougurt
Notes: This table presents the BLS item indexes used to construct the CPI-U comparable to the indexes I created using the
IRI data.
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Table 1.13: Market Weights Applied to IRI Scanner Data Market Indexes
IRI Market BLS Weights Notes IRI Market BLS Weights Notes
atlanta 1.37 omaha 0.88 (used Lincoln)
birmingham 0.89 philadelphia 2.73
boston 2.52 phoenix 1.04
buﬀalo 0.68 portland 0.83
charlotte 1 No Match raleigh 0.82
cleveland 1.32 richmond 0.89
dallas 1.87 roanoke 0.2 (no match 25% size of Birmingham)
desmoines 0.8 No Match sacramento 0.83 (no match - population ~ Portland)
detroit 2.4 saltlake 1.01 (no match used Provo)
grandrapids 0.2 No Match sandiego 1.16
greenbay 0.2 No Match sanfran 2.89
harrisburg 1 No Match seattle 1.37
houston 1.73 southcarolina 0.92
indianapolis 1 (no match 1.7mm people) stlouis 1.15
kansascity 0.73 washington 2.01
knoxville 0.81 (no match used Chattanooga) westtex 1
la 4.1 syracuse 0.87
milwaukee 0.74 hartford 0.83
minneapolis 1.18 chicago 3.81
newengland 0.74 (no match - used Burlington)
nyc 3.39
Notes: These are the weights applied to each market in constructing the regular price index and unit price indexes
discussed in Section 4.
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1.E Within Market Synchronization
Below I repeat the synchronization analysis within a single city. The 75th percentile measures are generally
higher than those for the full sample. This is likely due to the fact that there is synchronization in sales
within stores of a particular chain and the top 3 chains account for over half of the stores in this sample.
I conclude that there is little evidence of synchronization other than within stores belonging to the same
chain.
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Table 1.14: Synchronization of Sales within Los Angeles
Category Fraction of Stores having a
Sale
(Observation = UPC-Week)
Average Fraction of
Items on Sale
Store
Count
Chain
Count
Top 3 Chains
% of Stores
25th Pctle Median 75th Pctle
Beer 8% 15% 26% 16% 127 10 57%
Blades 2% 6% 12% 8% 131 13 54%
Carbonated Beverages 11% 24% 37% 22% 132 13 55%
Cigarettes 1% 2% 4% 4% 131 12 55%
Coﬀee 7% 13% 21% 14% 130 11 55%
Cold Cereal 6% 13% 23% 16% 130 11 55%
Deodorant 4% 8% 13% 10% 132 13 55%
Diapers 6% 11% 18% 13% 131 12 55%
Facial Tissue 8% 16% 28% 19% 132 13 55%
Frozen Dinners 15% 25% 36% 26% 123 11 58%
Frozen Pizza 16% 25% 34% 26% 113 10 63%
Household Cleaners 6% 12% 21% 13% 132 13 55%
Hot dogs 13% 22% 32% 23% 112 10 63%
Laundry Detergent 8% 15% 23% 16% 131 12 55%
Margarine and Butter 8% 14% 23% 16% 124 11 57%
Mayonnaise 3% 10% 23% 12% 129 11 55%
Milk 5% 11% 19% 12% 130 11 55%
Mustard and Ketchup 2% 7% 15% 9% 129 11 55%
Paper Towels 5% 11% 19% 14% 131 13 54%
Peanut Butter 6% 13% 23% 13% 128 11 55%
Photo Supplies 1% 4% 10% 7% 132 13 55%
Razors 2% 6% 12% 9% 131 13 54%
Salty Snacks 7% 16% 30% 17% 132 13 55%
Shampoos 4% 8% 15% 11% 132 13 55%
Soup 4% 11% 24% 14% 130 11 55%
Spaghetti Sauce 10% 18% 28% 18% 130 11 55%
Sugar Substitutes 1% 4% 10% 6% 130 12 55%
Toilette Tissue 8% 15% 25% 17% 132 13 55%
Toothbrushes 4% 9% 17% 13% 132 13 55%
Toothpaste 4% 10% 18% 12% 132 13 55%
Yogurt 10% 19% 28% 20% 119 11 60%
Notes: This table presents synchronization data for Los Angeles in 2005. Again, the percentiles are calculated from those
UPC-week cells in which at least one item was on sale (zeros are excluded). In columns 2 through 4, the unit of observation
is a UPC-Week and the measure is the fraction of stores with the UPC on sale in a given week. I also present the number of
stores and chains, as well as the percent of all stores that belong to the top 3 chains. This is to give the reader an idea of
how much synchronization to expect given that chains typically have similar pricing plans across stores.
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CHAPTER 2
A MODEL OF SALES
2.1 Introduction
Three important papers on the macroeconomics of sales have concluded that sales are, more or less, unim-
portant for macro economists (Eichenbaum et al., 2011; Guimaraes and Sheedy, 2011; Kehoe and Midrigan,
2010, EJR, GS, and KM, hereafter.). EJR and KM generate sales in modiﬁed menu cost models by adding
frequent, large, and transient idiosyncratic cost shocks. In GS, on the other hand, sales arise in equilibrium
as a result of strategic interaction between ﬁrms who face some consumers with very low price elasticities
and others with high price elasticities. Policy experiments performed with calibrated versions of each model
indicate that high frequency price changes due to sales do not result in neutrality of money.
However, each of these models is inconsistent with some important facts about sales discussed in the
previous chapter. First, sales are not synchronized across stores or similar items. This suggests that a sale
on an individual item is not caused by a temporary reduction in the manufacturer's price. Second, average
unit price varies more than regular price does because the fraction of revenue from sales varies over time. I
also provided evidence that unit price appears to be more responsive to demand shocks than regular price.
The evidence suggests that sales have a role in aggregate price adjustment.
The objective of this chapter is to show that even if the primary purpose of sales is to price discriminate,
sales may be important for mitigating the eﬀect of a demand shock on quantity sold. I sketch a simple model
in which sales arise as a result of diﬀerences in information about where to ﬁnd the lowest price. Demand
uncertainty is resolved after ﬁrms set price and in equilibrium, ﬁrms are indiﬀerent between the sale price
and the regular price, ex ante.
There are two channels through which sales, can facilitate price adjustment. The ﬁrst channel is
analogous to the additional units sold when a monopolist is able to price discriminate. Think in terms of a
market in which a price sensitive group can obtain a good for a low price and the less sensitive group obtains
it for a higher price. If there is a shift in the relative size of these two groups, the monopolist who can price
discriminate will accommodate this shift better than one who cannot. The second channel results from the
assumption that price and capacity are ﬁxed before uncertainty about the state of demand is realized. The
lowest priced items sell ﬁrst. Thus when demand is high, there is available capacity at higher prices so the
market clears. On the other hand, when demand is low, the low priced items sell ﬁrst so the market performs
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better than if ﬁrms all selected a single (high) price.
The model is able to replicate several facts that we observe about price setting behavior. First, ﬁrms
select between one of two prices. I interpret the high price as the regular price and the low price as the sale
price. Second, sales are not synchronized across locations. Third, posted prices appear to be sticky, but
average price paid is correlated with the state of demand. Finally, the fraction of items sold at a sale price
tends to be high when aggregate demand is low. This is consistent with the ﬁnding that sales rise when
unemployment is relatively high. An important result from this model is that sales help to clear the market
when prices are sticky and demand turns out to be relatively low.
Below I provide a brief overview of macro and micro models of sales. The idea is to contrast sev-
eral diﬀerent approaches. Next I present the model and highlight some analytical results obtained from a
parametrized version. I conclude with some suggestions for extending the model.
2.2 Macro Models with Sales
Three important articles have recently been published about the macroeconomics of sales. All three models
generate individual price series that ﬂuctuate a lot from week to week but commonly return to a modal price.
They each conclude sales are more or less, unimportant for macroeconomics. None of the models result in
cyclical changes in the aggregate fraction of revenue from sales.
Both EJR and KM augment a standard menu cost model by giving ﬁrms a cheaper, but imperfect
alternative to incurring the menu cost of adjusting price. In EJR, ﬁrms can select a diﬀerent price from
the price plan. KM allow ﬁrms to incur a small cost for a one period adjustment (after which price
automatically reverts to the inherited price). Both models generate frequent week to week price changes
by incorporating volatile idiosyncratic cost and/or demand shocks. In both cases, sales actually result in
stickier reference or list prices because ﬁrms tend to take advantage of the alternative to incurring the
menu cost.
This work convincingly demonstrates that sales, in the context of a modiﬁed menu cost model, do
not imply money neutrality. This result depends crucially on the use of highly volatile idiosyncratic costs to
generate frequent week to week price changes. EJR ﬁnd that indeed, accounting data indicate substantial
acquisition cost volatility. This simply pushes the question back to the manufacturer. Why are prices from
the manufacturer so volatile? This is especially diﬃcult to reconcile with the fact that most of the items
analyzed are storable.
Large idiosyncratic cost shocks at the manufacturer should cause substantial co-movement of prices
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for individual items across retailers and stores.1 This behavior is absent from the data. I ﬁnd that sales
tend to be staggered across locations and Nakamura (2008) reports that only 16 percent of price variation is
common across stores. To summarize, it seems unlikely that sales result from cost shocks, and even if they
do, the story is more complicated than what has been modeled thus far.
Guimaraes and Sheedy (2011) build a DSGE macro model in which sales arise out of strategic behavior
between ﬁrms. In this model, sales are a technique for extracting more value out of a market composed of
consumers with varying demand elasticities. Nevertheless, the eﬀects of monetary policy are nearly identical
to those of a benchmark model without sales. This is because sales are strategic substitutes. When there
is shock common to everyone in the market, the eﬀect on sales is small because all ﬁrms want to make the
same change to the frequency and/or depth of sales, which in turn provides substantial incentive not to do
so.
In this model, there is very little volatility in the fraction of revenue from sales because consumers
do not actively take advantage of sale prices. Equilibrium pricing means that all consumers are indiﬀerent
between any given instant in which to purchase goods. As we have seen in the data from chapter 1, there
are substantial ﬂuctuations in the fraction of revenue from sales that do not appear to be purely random.
2.3 Micro Models of Sales
In the industrial organization (IO) literature, the topic of sales is often treated as a particular type of
price dispersion. Upon reviewing this literature, it appears that over the course of the 1970's and 1980's,
much eﬀort was directed towards ﬁnding the bare essentials that result in equilibrium price dispersion. In
general, IO models of sales (price dispersion) rely on imperfect information, heterogeneous consumers, and/or
heterogeneous cost.
Reinganum (1979) generates price dispersion in a fairly simple model in which consumers engage in
sequential search. Equilibrium price dispersion results from variation in marginal cost and downward sloping
demand (as opposed to unit demand). On the other hand, Varian (1980) obtains equilibrium price dispersion
in a model with identical ﬁrms and free entry by including two diﬀerent types of shoppers (informed and
uninformed). In equilibrium, ﬁrms select price from a continuous distribution and each sell to an equal
fraction of uninformed shoppers regardless of price. One lucky ﬁrm will select the lowest price and sell to all
of the informed shoppers in addition to its share of the uninformed shoppers.
These models are built upon the intuitively appealing idea that knowing when and where to buy
1This is because the Robinson-Patman Act of 1936 restricts the ability of manufacturers to price discriminate among retailers
unless justiﬁable by diﬀerences in cost.
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something at a low price is not trivial. However, basing empirical analysis on them is troublesome because
they rely heavily on continuity in the equilibrium distribution of prices.
Sobel (1984) and Conlisk, Gerstner and Sobel (1984) model sales as a means of intertemporal price
discrimination. Consumers with varying preferences enter the market in each period. Some are impatient
with high reservation values while others are patient with low reservation values. The ﬁrm(s) will typically
charge a high price that only induces the high types to buy. Over time, low types accumulate until market
elasticity is high enough to induce a one period price cut. This model captures many of the features of sales
that we observe (e.g. returning to a previous price after a temporary price cut), but it is not clear how to
implement the idea when there are many close substitutes available right next to each other.
Consumer heterogeneity and search costs are at the heart of micro models of sales and should be taken
into account by macro studies of sales.2 These ideas do not rule out the possibility that sales are important
for macroeconomics. For instance, shifts in the composition of consumers could result in ﬂuctuations in the
frequency or depth of sales. This idea is discussed in Chevalier and Kashyap (2011).
2.4 A Model of Price Dispersion with Two Prices
I try to replicate two important facts about sales with this model: 1) sales are not the result of week to
week variation in marginal cost, and 2) price typically varies between two discrete prices. I follow the IO
literature and generate price dispersion using diﬀerences in information about where to ﬁnd the best price.
Firms sell identical goods and randomize between two prices. Much like Varian's (1980) model, there
are two types of consumers: informed and uninformed. The informed consumers are able to locate stores
charging a low price and always buy from low priced stores. As a result, low priced stores always sell all of
their capacity. On the other hand, high priced stores sell some fraction of their capacity when demand is
low. This model is closely related to the uncertain and sequential trade models in Eden (1994) and Eden
(2005). Prices are not allowed to adjust in response to the realization of demand and capacity is ﬁxed, but
dispersion of posted prices facilitates market clearing.
The model reproduces two important facts about sales discussed in Chapter 1. First, the probability
of a sale at one location does not depend on whether another store is having a sale. Sales are staggered
rather than synchronized. Second, posted price does not vary with demand, but average unit price does.
When demand is high, average unit price is also high. When demand is low, the fraction of items sold at a
sale price is relatively high so unit price is relatively low.
2Guimaraes and Sheedy (2011) is an outstanding example of incorporating a strategic motivation for sales into a DSGE
model.
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Consumers
There are two types of consumers: shoppers and buyers. Shoppers learn each ﬁrm's posted price at no cost
and chose a store charging the lowest price at random. In Varian (1980), the probability that there is a tie
between stores charging the lowest price is zero. In this model, the distribution of prices will be discrete and
a positive fraction of ﬁrms charge the lowest price. The fraction of consumers who are shoppers is S ∈ (0, 1).
Buyers do not learn the posted price of any ﬁrm. They only learn the maximum possible price that
may be charged by their preferred store and the maximum possible price that they would pay if they visited
another store at random. For simplicity, I make an ad hoc assumption about the way buyers select a store.
Buyers will visit their favorite store as long as the highest possible price at this store is less than or equal
to the highest possible price at other stores. Otherwise, they randomly select another store to visit. Each
store has an equal number of loyal buyers.
The assumption about how buyers chose where to shop could be modeled explicitly through a cost
of searching. One could also think of a behavioral motivation. Perhaps buyers use a simple rule that they
believe ensures they pay a fair price on average. The assumption is closely related to the one made in
Wilde and Schwartz (1979) in which a ﬁxed proportion of consumers have a certain taste for shopping and
sample a ﬁxed number of prices.
Consumers are otherwise identical and demand the good according to the demand function D(p),
which is continuously diﬀerentiable with D′(p) < 0. Finally, the number of consumers is a random variable
which takes two possible values: N and (1+δ)N with equal probability. I assume, without loss of generality,
that δ > 0.
Firms
There is a large number of equally sized ﬁrms which we will normalize to a measure of one. Firms sell a ﬁxed
quantity L, of a homogeneous good. Capacity is distributed evenly across ﬁrms.3 The cost of selling a unit
of capacity is constant and assumed to be zero for simplicity. Firms select a distribution of prices prior to
the realization of demand in order to maximize expected proﬁts given expectations about what other ﬁrms
will do.
The Sequence of Events
To understand the model, it is best to carefully describe the sequence of events:
3The model can easily be extended to allow for endogenous capacity choice. See the Appendix for a brief discussion. Since I
am primarily interested in the eﬀect of sales on capacity utilization, we do not gain anything by adding this complexity to the
model.
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1. Nature determines whether there will be N or N(1 + δ) consumers in the market. Neither ﬁrms nor
consumers observe the outcome of this event.
2. Firm j chooses a price distribution Fj(p) ∼ [pl, ph] and informs everyone of ph
3. Firm j selects a price randomly from Fj(p)
4. Shoppers observe each ﬁrm's price and select randomly from the set of stores posting the lowest price
5. Buyers who prefer store j decide to shop there if max{pih}i 6=j ≥ pjh
6. Buyers and shoppers form a line at the store they selected and are treated symmetrically. By this I
mean that any segment of the line has the same ratio of buyers to shoppers.
7. Consumers who visit store j each buy D(pj) units.
8. If ﬁrm j does not have enough capacity to satisfy demand, the fraction of consumers who did not get
to buy from ﬁrm j at price pj go ﬁnd another ﬁrm that still has capacity.
Equilibrium
Equilibrium is a price distribution for each ﬁrm that maximizes expected proﬁts given the price distributions
selected by other ﬁrms. I focus on a symmetric equilibrium in which the distribution of prices is discrete
with two possible outcomes. This is motivated by the fact that stores typically charge one of two prices in
any given week (EJR, 2011). The high and low prices (ph and pl) are analogous to the regular and sale
price. Let µ be the probability assigned to pl.
I provide the intuition behind a two price equilibrium and then state the equilibrium conditions
formally. Firms must be unable to increase expected proﬁts by changing their price distribution. This
implies three things about the equilibrium price distribution.
First, ﬁrms must be indiﬀerent between either price. Low priced ﬁrms sell all of their capacity
regardless of the state of demand. High priced ﬁrms sell a fraction of their capacity (to their loyal buyers)
in the low state of demand and all of their capacity in the high state of demand (since all additional
consumers must ﬁnd a high priced store in order to buy the good). Either price is expected to generate the
same amount of revenue in equilibrium. Let φ be the average fraction of capacity sold by a ﬁrm posting the
high price, ph. Firms are indiﬀerent between two prices {pl, ph} as long as pl = φph. Note that 1 > φ.
Second, the low price must equate demand to capacity available at low priced stores when demand is
low.4 Suppose not. If there is excess demand at stores charging pl when demand is low, then some shoppers
4Note that this implies that low priced stores sell out regardless of the state of demand.
50
would be unable to ﬁnd capacity at the lowest priced stores and would go to the next lowest priced store with
capacity. In this situation, a store could increase expected proﬁts by selecting a slightly higher low price,
say pl+ because it would sell all of its capacity regardless of the state of demand. On the other hand, if there
is excess supply (at low priced stores when demand is low) then a ﬁrm would sell more units (at zero marginal
cost) by cutting price a small amount. In a two price equilibrium, the number of consumers that visit low
priced stores in the low demand state is µ(1−S)N buyers plus SN shoppers. The total amount of capacity
available at a low price is µL. Thus, one equilibrium condition is that (µ(1− S)N + SN)D(pl) = µL.
Our third equilibrium condition is that the high price, ph, should equate capacity available at high
priced stores to the demand of consumers who eventually visit a high priced store when demand is high. The
number of consumers who visit a high priced store in the high demand state is (1− µ) (1− S)N + δN and
the capacity of high priced stores is (1− µ)L.5 The third equilibrium condition is (1− µ) (1− S)N + δN =
(1− µ)L. Posting a higher price is unproﬁtable because no consumers will visit such a store in the low
demand state. On the other hand, selecting ph−  is a bad idea because it results in no additional consumers
in either state of demand. I show formally that such deviations are not proﬁtable in the appendix.
We can now deﬁne equilibrium as a vector (pl, ph, µ, φ) 0 that satisﬁes the following conditions for
a given level of capacity L:
1) pl = φph
2) µL = N (S + µ(1− S))D(pl)
3) (1− µ)L = N ((1− µ)(1− S) + δ)D(ph)
4) φ =
N((1−µ)(1−S)+ 12 δ)D(ph)
(1−µ)L
To summarize, equation 1 is an arbitrage condition that requires expected revenue to be the same
regardless of the posted price. Equation 2 is the market clearing condition for the low demand state. Capacity
equals demand for the stores selling at the low price when demand is low. The market clearing condition for
the high demand state is equation 3. It says that capacity equals demand for the stores selling at a high price
when demand is high. Finally, equation 4 is the deﬁnition of φ, which is the expected fraction of capacity
sold at the high price.
In the Appendix, I show that an equilibrium of the type described above exists as long as demand is
not too elastic or inelastic at the high price. The equilibrium can only be solved in closed form if we assume
certain types of demand functions. In the next section, I solve for the case of unit elastic demand and do
some comparative statics.
5Some of these consumers will have initially visited a low priced store only to ﬁnd that it was out of stock.
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Parametrized Example
To analyze the model, I solve a simple parametrized version analytically. Let us suppose that D(p) = ap ,
S ∈ (0, 1) and δ > 0. We will assume that capacity is exogenously determined for now. The equilibrium
vector (pl, ph, µ, φ) in the case of unit elastic demand is as follows:
pl = a
N
L
(
1 + δ2
)
ph = a
N
L (1 + S + δ)
µ = 2S2S+δ
φ = 2+δ2(1+S+δ)
Notice that both µ and φ are less than zero. I would like to emphasize that this equilibrium only
applies for S ∈ (0, 1). If S is zero or one, then the distribution of prices degenerates.
Fraction of prices quotes that are sales
The fraction of price quotes that are sale prices, pl, is equal to the probability of a sale, µ. Notice that µ
depends on the relative size of shoppers S and the volatility of demand, δ. Of course, by construction, it
cannot depend on the realization of demand since it is speciﬁed before hand.
Not surprisingly, µ is increasing in the fraction of consumers that are shoppers, S. This is because
ceterus paribus, more shoppers tend to drive up the price that equates demand to supply in the low demand
state (pl). Thus, ﬁrms have an incentive to increase the probability of a sale, which in turn, would push the
equilibrium low price back to the point at which ﬁrms are indiﬀerent between prices.
The probability of a sale decreases with the volatility of demand, δ. The upside of posting a high
price increases with the size of the high demand state (relative to the low demand state) so ﬁrms have an
incentive to increase the probability of posting a high price as δ gets larger.
Discount size
The percentage diﬀerence between pl and ph (1 − plph ) (referred to as the discount in Chapter 1), is equal
to 2S+δ2(1+S+δ) . The discount is increasing in both S and δ. Notice that the low price does not depend on
the number of shoppers. When the relative size of shoppers increases, the high price needs to rise in order
to compensate for relatively fewer consumers who will buy at the high price in the low demand state. An
increase in the parameter δ increases both expected demand and the standard deviation of demand. As a
result, both the low price and the high price are increasing in δ, but the high price is more sensitive. This
result is also obtained in uncertain and sequential trade models discussed in Eden (2005).
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Average posted price versus average unit price
This model also illustrates how aggregate price may appear to be unresponsive to changes in demand while
at the same time, average unit price is responsive to demand. The consumer price index aggregates a survey
of posted prices. In this model, the price level measured in this way is not aﬀected by the state of demand.
In either case, average posted price is µpl + (1 − µ)ph. On the other hand, average unit price does depend
on the state of demand. More units are purchased at the high price when demand is high so average unit
price is higher in the high demand state.
Output elasticity
In this model, sales tend to reduce the eﬀect of demand ﬂuctuations on output. To see this, consider two
diﬀerent economies: one in which the fraction of shoppers, S is zero, and the other in which shoppers make
up some fraction of consumers (S ∈ (0, 1)). When there are no shoppers, stores never have sales and the
price is always ph. Output, measured by the amount of capacity sold, is ND(ph) in the low demand state
and (1 + δ)ND(ph) in the high demand state. When there are no sales, output elasticity is one (percentage
change in demand = percentage change in output). When S ∈ (0, 1), output in the high demand state
relative to output in the low demand state is 1 + δ1+S < 1 + δ which means that output elasticity is
1
1+S .
The eﬀect of sales on the elasticity of output depends on the fraction of consumers that are shoppers,
S. If the number of shoppers is small, then sales have little eﬀect on the elasticity of output because they
occur infrequently and the discount is small. The analysis above applies only to the case of constant unit-
elastic demand. For future research, I propose using numerical analysis to study the model under more
general demand functions.
2.5 Conclusion
The purpose of this chapter was to illustrate how sales can facilitate price adjustment even when prices are
perfectly sticky. In the model outlined above, ﬁrms set price before the realization of demand so posted
prices cannot adjust to changes in demand. However, because there is a distribution of prices in equilibrium,
average unit price responds to demand because the lower priced items get purchased ﬁrst and the higher
priced items tend to be purchased in higher quantities when demand is relatively high. Therefore, sales, (or
dispersed prices) are an important mechanism through which the quantity sold adjusts to ﬂuctuations in
demand.
Several features of this model are consistent with what we observe in the data. First, posted prices are
53
uncorrelated across locations. In Chapter 1 we found that sales on speciﬁc items were not synchronized across
stores. I interpret this as evidence that sales are not primarily the result of idiosyncratic cost shocks. In the
model above, sales occur because stores randomize between two prices when consumers are heterogeneous in
their information and/or willingness to shop. The probability of a sale does not depend on whether another
store is having a sale. Instead, the probability of a sale depends on characteristics of consumers and the
volatility of demand.
Second, average posted price does not respond to changes in demand but average unit price does. In
the model, stores select price before demand is realized so posted prices cannot adjust. However, consumers
tend to buy the lower priced items ﬁrst so when demand is low, the fraction of revenue from sales is high and
the average unit price is low. In the data, the CPI is slow to respond to monetary policy shocks. Evidence
presented in chapter one indicates that unit price is more responsive to aggregate demand conditions. In
Chapter 1 we also saw that a rise in the unemployment rate preceeded an increase in the fraction of revenue
from sales.
The key diﬀerence between this model and others used for studying sales in the macroeconomy is that
the fraction of revenue from sales is responsive to aggregate demand shocks. To the best of my knowledge,
EJR, KM, and GS, all result in more or less static features of sales. The model sketched above is a prototype
that could be developed further to conduct policy analysis. It suggests that there is a simple way in which
sales might play an important role in aggregate price adjustment. For future research, I propose a cash-in-
advance version of this model that could be calibrated and used to conduct monetary policy experiments.
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APPENDIX
2.A Existence of Equilibrium
Below I will show that an equilibrium of the type described in the text above exists. I do so by solving for
equilibrium under a parametrized version of the model that can be solved analytically.
Solving for the equilibrium vector.
I take L as given and show how to solve for (pl, ph, µ, φ). Using conditions (1) and (2) and assuming that
demand is homogeneous of degree α < 0 we can see that:
φ =
(
µL
D(ph)(S + µ(1− S))N1
) 1
α
Next we can use equation (3) to substitute for D(ph) above:
φ =
(
µ ((1− µ)(1− S) + δ)
(1− µ)(S + µ(1− S))
) 1
α
(2.A.1)
Combining conditions (3) and (4) we can write a separate equation for φ in terms of µ
φ =
(1− µ)(1− S) + 12δ
(1− µ)(1− S) + δ (2.A.2)
Unless α = −1, there is no analytical solution to the equations above. It can be shown that equations
2.A.1 and 2.A.2 are both decreasing in µ. So, I perform a numerical analysis to get an idea of what restrictions
must be placed on S and δ in order for the solution to result in µ ∈ (0, 1) and φ ∈ (0, 1).
In general, the equilibrium exists except for very small values of δ and S (in the neighborhood of .01).
Under these circumstances, the distribution of price degenerates.
Ensuring there are no proﬁtable deviations
To ensure we indeed have a Nash equilibrium, I check to make sure that deviations from this strategy are
not proﬁtable given that other ﬁrms charge pl with probability µ and ph with probability 1− µ.
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Small reduction in ph
Does a small reduction in ph increase expected revenue? In the high demand state, marginal revenue is
(1 − µ)L for price cuts because the store will not sell additional units. In the low demand state, marginal
revenue is N(1 − S)(1 − µ) (D′(ph)ph +D(ph)). Thus, the change in expected revenue from this deviation
is:
−N(1− S)(1− µ)D(ph)(1 + e)− (1− µ)L
which is weakly negative if:
1 +
(1− µ)L
N(1− S)(1− µ)D(ph) ≥ |e|
Since (1 − µ)L > N(1 − S)(1 − µ)D(ph), the LHS > 2. Thus, as long as demand isn't too elastic at ph
(elasticity less than two is suﬃcient but not necessary) then increasing ph is not proﬁtable.
Small increase in ph
If an individual ﬁrm chooses to post a high price that is higher than ph, then it will sell to no one in the
low demand state because its regular customers will search for a store with a lower high price. It will sell to
N ((1− S)(1− µ) + δ) customers in the high demand state because all other stores will be sold out. Thus,
the expected change in revenue from a small increase in ph is:
N ((1− S)(1− µ) + δ)D (ph) (1 + e)−N(1− S)(1− µ)D (ph)
where e is the elasticity of demand at ph. This quantity is weakly negative when:
−e ≥ δ
(1− S)(1− µ) + δ
A suﬃcient condition for this deviation to be unproﬁtable would that demand is elastic at ph (because the
RHS is less than one).
Changes in pl
A reduction in pl reduces expected revenue because all capacity is sold at pl regardless of the state of demand.
A store increasing pl by a small amount would no longer sell all of its capacity in the low demand state at the
low price. Choosing a low price above pl is like selecting two diﬀerent high prices in terms of the expected
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number of shoppers that will show up. We have already shown above that no high price other than ph can
be optimal unless demand is highly elastic or inelastic. Of course, an individual store would be indiﬀerent
between charging ph with probability 1 and charging pl with probability 1.
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2.B Endogenous Capacity
Allowing for capacity to be chosen endogenously is a fairly simple extension. I assume that ﬁrms select
capacity at the moment they set the distribution of prices. The cost of L units of capacity is C(L), which is
increasing and convex. The cost of selling a unit of capacity is still assumed to be zero.
The optimal capacity choice will depend on the distribution of prices and the average fraction of
capacity sold at the high price. Thus, the optimal capacity can be determined as:
L(pl, ph, µ, φ) = max
L
µLpl + (1− µ)φLph − C(L)
The necessary and suﬃcient condition for an optimal choice of L is :
µpl + (1− µ)φph = C ′(L)
Equilibrium is now a vector (pl, ph, µ, L, φ)  0 conditions 1 through 4 in section 2.4 as well as the
following additional condition for determining capacity:
5) µpl + (1− µ)φph = C ′(L) (capacity choice is optimal given the price distribution and φ).
Note that conditions 1) and 5) imply that the optimal capacity is L∗ such that C ′(L∗) = pl.
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CHAPTER 3
SALES AND FIRM ENTRY: THE CASE OF WAL-MART1
3.1 Introduction
In the ongoing quest to understand pricing behavior, Nakamura and Steinsson (2008) found that the fraction
of price quotes that are sales (i.e. temporary price reductions) has increased substantially over the last two
decades. Certain product categories, such as breakfast cereal or potato chips, are now on sale twice as often
as they were in the late 1980's. Determining the cause of this trend is important not only for understanding
why ﬁrms have sales, but also for the ongoing debate about the role that sales play in aggregate price
adjustment.2 We examine one possible explanation for the rise in the frequency of sales: the diﬀusion of
Wal-Mart stores. We show that frequent but temporary price reductions can be a rational response to ﬁrm
entry and then show that a representative grocery chain appears to have responded this way to Wal-Mart's
entry.3
The expansion of Wal-Mart dramatically altered the retail landscape. Since 1980, Wal-Mart have
grown from 300 stores located in 11 states to over 3,700 stores with locations in every state. The chain's
revenue is now about 8 percent of U.S. consumption expenditure on goods, and 80% of grocery stores cited
Wal-Mart-type stores as their biggest concern.4 Unlike traditional retailers who have periodic price reductions
(i.e. sales), Wal-Mart attracts customers through everyday low prices. ? estimated that competition with
this strategy was responsible for a 21% reduction in purchases at incumbent stores.
Many empirical studies have examined Wal-Mart's eﬀect on the prices and revenue of incumbent
retailers. Basker (2005) and Basker and Noel (2009) ﬁnd that incumbents lower their average quarterly price
over time, whereas Volpe and Lavoie (2008) ﬁnd that the prices of national brands are lowered further than
those of private-label brands. Singh et al. (2006) ﬁnd that the majority of revenue lost to Wal-Mart is due
to decreased customers rather than decreased baskets. More importantly, they argue that incumbents can
signiﬁcantly mitigate revenue losses by keeping just a few of their best customers.
To the best of our knowledge, only Ailawadi et al. (2010) has addressed Wal-Mart's eﬀect on sales
1This chapter was co-authored with Matthew Jaremski, an economics graduate student at Vanderbilt University.
2See for example,Chevalier and Kashyap (2011); Eichenbaum et al. (2011); Guimaraes and Sheedy (2011); Kehoe and
Midrigan (2010)
3Throughout the rest of the paper, the term sales will only refer to temporary price reductions. We use the term revenue
when we address the price times quantity sold.
4National Grocers Association (2003)
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behavior using high frequency data. They ﬁnd that the number of sales decreases for supermarkets and
increases for drug stores and mass format stores in response to Wal-Mart. The paper represents an impressive
ﬁrst step, but there are two drawbacks. First, it examines the entry of Wal-Mart supercenters even though
many of the locations were already served by a Wal-Mart discount store. Despite a potential cooling oﬀ
period, stores might have already adjusted to Wal-Mart, the small reactions to additional entry might be
expected. Second, it focused on category-level data, while we ﬁnd that changes to pricing strategy following
Wal-Mart's entry depend on product speciﬁc characteristics.
We begin by showing that an increase in sales could be an optimal response to Wal-Mart by recasting
the repeated price competition model in Lal (1990). In the model, two incumbent ﬁrms sell to loyal customers
and customers who only buy from the lowest priced ﬁrm. Both ﬁrms charge a high price in duopoly and split
the market. When a third ﬁrm with a lower marginal cost and no loyal customers enters, the incumbent's
high prices are no longer optimal and they will do better by taking turns setting a low price. Similar to
Wal-Mart, the entrant chooses a constant but low price strategy.
We use scanner data from the Dominick's Finer Foods database to test whether the stores in the
grocery chain responded to Wal-Mart entry with more frequent sales.5 The data span six years and consist
of 3,828 products allowing us to control for unobserved heterogeneity at very ﬁne levels (e.g. the UPC-store).
The data contains each store's location, allowing us to isolate Wal-Mart's eﬀect on individual stores, and
the sample period corresponds to the initial entry of Wal-Mart. We ﬁnd that stores signiﬁcantly increased
their sales frequency as their distance to Wal-Mart declined. Consistent with a loss-leader strategy, the
increases in sales frequency were concentrated on the most popular products. The adjustment of sales thus
seems to be a competitive response to Wal-Mart and not a secular trend.
3.2 A Repeated Game of Retail Price Competition with Firm Entry
The Industrial Organization literature presents several reasons for the existence of sales, but many of these
models are unsuited for studying the frequency of sales. In Varian (1980), ﬁrms keep consumers (rationally)
uninformed over time by choosing price randomly from a continuous distribution. However, the only un-
ambiguous deﬁnition of a sale price in this model is that the lowest observed price is the sale price. This
deﬁnition leaves no room for variation in the frequency of sales. In Conlisk et al. (1984), a monopolist
generally charges a high regular price but is occasionally induced into charging a temporarily low price when
enough low reservation price consumers accumulate in the market. The model provides clear predictions
5Among others, Hoch et al. (1994), Hoch et al. (1995), Peltzman (2000), Chevalier et al. (2003), and Kehoe and Midrigan
(2010) have all used the DFF data to study price setting.
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about the frequency of sales, but the assumptions do not approximate the market for consumer packaged
goods which we wish to study.
The most compelling model for studying the frequency of sales in the context of ﬁrm entry is Lal
(1990). He seeks to explain the peculiar fact that on any given week, either brand A or brand B could be
found on sale in a single store, but never both. We recast this model to represent retailers who face the
entry of a low cost competitor.6 We use the model to show that ﬁrm entry may cause two incumbent ﬁrms
to switch from charging the same price every period to a strategy of alternating between a high and a low
price.
Model Setup
The model consists of a retail market in which there are initially two ﬁrms, A and B, (called incumbents)
engaged in repeated Bertrand price competition. A third ﬁrm, C, (called the entrant) unexpectedly enters
the market. Each ﬁrm maximizes discounted proﬁts using a common discount rate of δ ∈ (0, 1). Firms A
and B have a marginal cost of c > 0 and ﬁrm C's marginal cost is normalized to zero.
There are two types of customers who purchase a homogeneous basket of goods from one of the ﬁrms
in each period as long as the price is less than or equal to r. The ﬁrst type of customer is loyal to one of
the incumbent ﬁrms and will only purchase the basket from that ﬁrm. The second type of customer is a
switcher who considers A and B to be perfect substitutes, but prefers them to C with varying intensity.
The number of switchers is normalized to 1 and the number of loyal customers per incumbent is α > 0.
Because switchers prefer the incumbents, ﬁrm C must charge a price lower than the minimum of the
incumbents' prices to attract any customers. The lower C's price is relative to min {pA, pB}, the more units
C will sell. Assuming without loss of generality that pA ≥ pB the fraction of switchers that will buy from
ﬁrm C is characterized the following way:
Entrant's Share =

0 if pc ≥ pB
pB−pC
d if pB ≥ pc ≥ pB − d
1 if pB − d > pc
(3.2.1)
Here d is a demand parameter that reﬂects the opportunity cost of visiting ﬁrm C instead of A or B
(e.g. the cost per unit of distance to get to C). Firms A and B will sell α baskets to their loyal consumers
and the incumbent with the lower price of the two will sell to the switchers who do not buy from ﬁrm C.7
6We also take a diﬀerent approach to proving the existence of the type of equilibrium we are interested in.
7For example, if pA ≥ pB ≥ pC then the revenue of A, B, and C will be pAα, pB
(
α+ 1− (pA−pC)
d
)
, and pC
(
pB−pC
d
)
respectively. This assumes that pC + d ≥ pB ≥ pC , otherwise, B gets either none or all of the switchers.
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Equilibrium
To understand how ﬁrm C's entry changes the pricing strategies of A and B, we ﬁrst analyze how they behave
before C's arrival. The maximum total proﬁt in this duopoly occurs when both ﬁrms charge r every period
and threaten to punish deviations with a ﬁnite period Nash reversion strategy. Proposition 1 describes this
equilibrium and states the conditions under which the price of r can be supported.
Proposition 1. If δ ≥ α−1α+1 , then the following symmetric strategy proﬁle is a pareto-dominant sub-game
perfect Nash equilibrium: Both ﬁrms charge a price of r in every period as long as both ﬁrms charged r in
the previous period. If a ﬁrm deviates, both ﬁrms charge a price of c for the next t-1 periods where t is the
largest positive integer such that δt ≥ 2α2α+1 . In the tth period following the deviation, ﬁrms resume charging
a price of r. If either ﬁrm deviates, then the punishment restarts.
Proof. See Appendix 3.B
Once ﬁrm C enters the market, the game has several equilibria. We focus our attention on the pure
strategy equilibria in which ﬁrm C plays a best response in each stage game. We argue that pure strategy
equalibria are more plausible because they do not require ﬁrms to have a randomizing device or a mechanism
for detecting deviations. Requiring the entrant to play a best response provides a simple equilibrium in which
only the incumbents need punishments to support the equilibrium path.8 From this set of pure strategy
equilibria, we focus on the one that maximizes the discounted proﬁts of the incumbents.
Once the entrant arrives, the equilibrium strategy that maximizes the incumbents' joint proﬁts involves
the incumbents staggering and alternating prices between the monopoly price, r, and a lower price, r¯. That
is to say that in any given period, one incumbent charges r and the other r¯ and then in the following
period they switch. This strategy can be supported without explicit collusion using a credible and eﬀective
punishment. The equations in (3.2.2) specify the punishment prices that A and B charge in the tth period
following a deviation from the equilibrium path:
pA = pB = c for t≤t∗ − 1
pA = r, pB = p for t = t
∗
pA = r¯, pB = r for t = t
∗ + 1
pA(t) = pB(t− 1) for t ≥ t∗ + 2
pB(t) = pA(t− 1) for t ≥ t∗ + 2
(3.2.2)
8This type of strategy is also consistent with Wal-Mart's slogan at the time: Always low prices. Always.
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On the equilibrium path, incumbent ﬁrms take turns charging r and ¯r < r. If either deviates, they
punish each other by charging a price of c for the next t∗ − 1 periods. In period t∗, ﬁrm A only sells to
its loyal customers at a price of r whereas ﬁrm B sells to some switchers by charging p < r.9 After period
t∗, the incumbents return to alternating prices of r and r¯. If either incumbent deviates, the punishment
phase begins again. Proposition 2 states that the strategy proﬁle described above is a sub-game perfect Nash
Equilibrium as long as the discount rate is large enough.
Proposition 2. As long as δ is large enough , there exists a sub-game perfect Nash Equilibrium strategy
proﬁle in which:
1. Firm C charges a price of r¯2 in every period.
2. On the equilibrium path, ﬁrms A and B alternate between a price of r and r¯ = 23 (α(1 + d) + c) < r.
3. Firms A and B punish each other as described in 3.2.2 for deviations from the equilibrium path.
Proof. See appendix 3.B.
Most models of imperfect competition predict a reduction in average price when a competitor enters a
market.10 This model's contribution is to suggest that ﬁrms have periodic sales instead of permanently
lowering price. In this way, they are still able to keep some price sensitive shoppers, while continuing to
extract monopoly proﬁts from their loyal customers some of the time.
3.3 Empirical Analysis
We wish to test the hypothesis that ﬁrms respond to entry by having sales. In practice, however, there are
many reasons that ﬁrms have sales and they probably all operate simultaneously. We therefore examine the
frequency of sales at 85 Dominick's Finer Foods (DFF) grocery stores before and after Wal-Mart's entry.
Table 3.1 summarizes the DFF weekly scanner data, which contains 3,828 products sold from 1989 to 1996.
The DFF data are well-suited for testing our hypotheses. First, the sample begins when Wal-Mart's
presence in the Chicago-area was limited to a single store and continues through the opening of 26 additional
stores. The near absence of Wal-Mart prior to the sample period also allows us to view each store's ﬁrst
reaction to Wal-Mart rather than the later introduction of a larger supercenter. Second, the panel aspect of
the data allows us to control for unobserved heterogeneity that is constant over time. For example, customer
demographics vary from place to place but are unlikely to change enough during the sample period to aﬀect
9For convenience, the price p is set to equalize ﬁrm A and B's discounted future proﬁts following a deviation.
10We focus on Wal-Mart, but this result applies to any big box retailer that enters a market where incumbents have loyal
customers as well as switchers.
64
T
a
b
le
3
.1
:
S
u
m
m
a
ry
o
f
D
o
m
in
ic
k
's
F
in
er
F
o
o
d
s
S
a
m
p
le
C
a
te
g
o
ry
S
o
ld
A
t
W
a
l-
M
a
rt
?
#
o
f
U
P
C
s
#
o
f
S
to
re
s
%
o
f
S
a
le
O
b
s.
P
ro
ﬁ
t
M
a
rg
in
(%
)
A
v
g
.
Q
u
a
n
ti
ty
S
o
ld
A
v
g
.
P
ri
ce
($
)
A
n
a
lg
es
ic
Y
es
3
2
0
8
5
3
.9
3
1
.3
1
.4
5
.4
B
a
th
ro
o
m
T
is
su
e
Y
es
5
7
8
1
1
5
.4
1
6.
9
1
3
.9
1
.9
B
o
tt
le
d
J
u
ic
es
Y
es
2
1
7
8
5
6
.0
2
9
.2
7
2
.7
1
.8
C
er
ea
ls
Y
es
2
2
7
8
5
1
0
.7
1
6
.6
9
.5
2
.2
C
o
o
k
ie
s
Y
es
4
2
8
8
5
9
.3
2
7
.7
1
6
.7
3
.1
D
is
h
D
et
er
g
en
t
Y
es
1
2
5
8
5
7
.6
2
2
.1
6
.1
2
.1
F
a
b
ri
c
S
o
ft
en
er
s
Y
es
1
5
6
8
5
1
3
.5
2
4
.9
9
.0
2
.3
F
ro
n
t
E
n
d
C
a
n
d
ie
s
Y
es
2
2
2
8
5
1
5
.9
3
9
.5
7
.0
2
.3
F
ro
ze
n
E
n
tr
ee
s
N
o
3
7
8
8
5
9
.5
3
3
.7
5
.2
2
.6
F
ro
ze
n
F
ru
it
J
u
ic
es
N
o
9
5
8
5
8
.6
3
4
.9
1
3
.1
0
.6
L
a
u
n
d
ry
D
et
er
g
en
t
Y
es
2
3
6
8
5
1
4
.2
1
8
.0
2
3
.0
1
.4
P
a
p
er
T
ow
el
s
Y
es
7
6
8
0
2
1
.2
2
2
.1
5
.6
5
.4
R
ef
ri
g
er
a
te
d
J
u
ic
es
N
o
1
0
2
8
5
2
2
.7
3
0
.4
43
.5
1
.5
S
n
a
ck
C
ra
ck
er
s
Y
es
1
8
0
8
5
1
7
.0
2
7
.1
7
.6
2
.2
S
o
ft
D
ri
n
k
s
Y
es
5
6
4
8
5
1
3
.3
1
6
.5
3
3
.1
2
.3
T
o
o
th
p
a
st
e
Y
es
2
8
8
8
5
7
.9
2
3
.7
2
.8
2
.3
T
u
n
a
N
o
1
5
7
8
5
1
7
.7
2
8
.2
2
3
.3
2
.6
A
ll
P
ro
d
u
ct
s
3
,8
2
8
8
5
1
2
.5
2
5
.8
1
7
.8
2
.6
N
o
te
s:
T
h
e
se
le
c
ti
o
n
o
f
th
e
sa
m
p
le
is
d
e
sc
ri
b
e
d
in
A
p
p
e
n
d
ix
3
.C
.
W
e
c
o
n
su
lt
e
d
m
o
d
e
rn
st
o
re
s
to
d
e
te
rm
in
e
w
h
e
th
e
r
a
p
ro
d
u
c
t
c
a
te
g
o
ry
w
a
s
so
ld
in
W
a
l-
M
a
rt
.
65
the pricing strategy of a particular store. Third, the data set contains the speciﬁc location of each store,
allowing us to identify the eﬀect of Wal-Mart on individual stores through variation across time and stores.
Because the sample period is early in the chain's expansion, the Wal-Mart stores which entered Chicago
before 1996 were discount stores rather than supercenters. This distinction is important because Wal-Mart's
discount stores do not sell fresh grocery products. Nevertheless, there is substantial overlap between the
products in the DFF sample and those sold by Wal-Mart discount stores. Based on observation of current
Wal-Mart discount stores, we estimate that the ones covered in our sample sold at least 13 of the 17 DFF
categories that we include in our analysis. Dominick's stores therefore would have directly competed with
Wal-Mart discount stores on several of its products.
The chain's pricing structure is a potential problem that must be addressed. DFF sets pricing policy
as a chain, but this does not necessarily mean that there will be no variation in the frequency of sales across
stores. While Dominick's has pricing zones, Eden and Jaremski (2010) show that there is heterogeneity
across stores. Each week, over a quarter of a store's prices diﬀer from the chain's most common price. In
addition, the median fraction of stores having a sale on a speciﬁc UPC is 24 percent. Stores thus seemed
capable of responding to idiosyncratic shocks.
Wal-Mart and the Frequency of Sales at Dominick's
The DFF data contain ﬂags indicating whether UPC i was on sale at a store j during week t. While a deal
ﬂag correctly indicates when there was a deal, the documentation suggests that some deals may have gone
unﬂagged. To capture these missing sales, we separately ﬂag any price that declined and returned back to
its original price or higher within two weeks. Our ﬁnal sale dummy variable, Salei,j,t, is the union of the
two measures.
To proceed, we need an operational deﬁnition of ﬁrm entry. The extent to which ﬁrms compete
depends on variables such as driving distance, traﬃc patterns, and other factors. Rather than selecting a
binary or discrete measure of competition, we use the driving distance to the nearest Wal-Mart as a proxy
for the intensity of competition with Wal-Mart. Using Thomas J. Holmes' Wal-Mart location data (Holmes,
2011), we compute Distjt, the shortest driving distance to a Wal-Mart for store j during week t.
Figure 3.3.1 illustrates Wal-Mart's growth by mapping the location and approximate entry date of
every store in the Chicago-area prior to 1996. Expanding towards the city-center, new Wal-Mart stores
opened near existing stores. Holmes argues that this dense network of stores allows the chain to sustain
distributional eﬃciency during expansion. Wal-Mart's entry location and timing thus seems to be determined
by logistical eﬃciency and may be considered exogenous to the time-varying unobserved factors that aﬀect
Dominick's frequency of sales.
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Figure 3.3.1: Location and Approximate Entry Date of Wal-Mart Stores Near Chicago
Note: Wal-Mart locations and entry dates were obtained from Holmes (2011). Dominick's locations
come from the online documentation of the DFF database.
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Figure 3.3.2: Average Distance to Wal-Mart vs. Fraction of Products on Sale
Notes: Average distance is the simple average across stores of the driving distance to the closest Wal-
Mart. The other two series use two diﬀerent smoothing techniques (moving average and HP-ﬁlter) to plot
the revenue weighted fraction of products on sale. Only the subset of categories that have a signiﬁcantly
negative distance coeﬃcient are used in the graph. The categories included are: bottled juices, breakfast
cereal, frozen juices, soft drinks, canned tuna, and toilette tissue. A similar but less pronounced trend
is observed for the entire set of categories.
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Figure 3.3.2 plots the average driving distance to the nearest Wal-Mart and the average frequency of
sales at DFF for selected categories. This ﬁgure illustrates that the frequency of sales rises as driving Wal-
Mart enters the market. For example, during October of 1991, a 45 percent drop in the average distance
to Wal-Mart (from 20 to 11 miles) corresponds to a 50 percent increase in the trend component of the
sales (from 12 to 18 percent). This graph indicates that the chain-wide frequency of sales increased rapidly
following Wal-Mart entry.
Two additional conclusions are visible in Figure 3.3.2. First, as shown by Singh et al. (2006), a response
in sales does not begin until Wal-Mart moves into a reasonable competitive distance (i.e. within 30 miles).
Second, the response begins to slightly dissipate after three years. Franklin (2001) ﬁnds that Wal-Mart's
market share grows over time, suggesting that some customers might have become loyal to Wal-Mart or more
sensitive to prices. Nevertheless, the frequency of sales remains at least 7 percentage points higher than its
initial value.
Store Level Eﬀect of Wal-Mart Entry
Building on the aggregate picture, we proceed with store-week panel regressions that control for unobserved
store-level heterogeneity. The dependent variable (%Salejt) is the percentage of products on sale in store
j during week t, and the independent variable (Distjt) is the driving distance in miles from store j to the
nearest Wal-Mart in week t. The regression is:
Salejt = α1Distjt + α2Qt + cj + ejt (3.3.1)
where Qt is a vector of quarter dummies to control for seasonal variation, cj is the unobserved store het-
erogeneity that is ﬁxed over time, and ejt is the error term. Observations are weighted by the store's
average share of chain revenue and standard errors are clustered by store to account for within-group serial
correlation.
The coeﬃcients in Table 3.2 show that individual stores increase their sales as Wal-Mart moved
closer. The estimates imply that the average drop in driving distance to the nearest Wal-Mart (35 miles)
increased the fraction of products on sale in a store by 1.05 percentage points. As the average frequency of
sales was small (around 10%), this eﬀect is both statistically and economically signiﬁcant. The remaining
columns provide the coeﬃcients of models that include a time trend or control for unobserved eﬀects at the
category-store level. Including a linear time trend increases the magnitude of the estimates of α1.
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Table 3.2: Linear Panel Regressions of %Salejt on Distjt
% of UPCs on Sale in week t
Store Store-Category
Distance -0.030*** -0.061*** -0.037*** -0.122***
[0.008] [0.009] [0.008] [0.009]
Linear Trend -0.005*** -0.013***
[0.001] [0.001]
Observations 31,856 31,856 542,758 542,758
Groups 85 85 1,519 1,519
R-squared 0.048 0.059 0.010 0.027
Notes: The ﬁrst two columns report results of a ﬁxed eﬀects panel estimate of two diﬀerent models
that use the store as the unit of analysis. The second column controls for a linear trend while the ﬁrst
column does not. The second two columns report analogous results from a random eﬀects estimate of
two models in which a category-store is the unit of analysis. The store level model includes a vector of
quarter dummies and the store-category model includes a vector of category x quarter dummies to
control for seasonal eﬀects for the chain and category respectively. The Distance coeﬃcients are
reported in percentage points per mile. T-Statistics are in brackets. Standard errors are clustered by
store, and regressions are weighted by Revenue Share of Cell. * denotes signiﬁcance at 10%; ** at 5%
level and *** at 1% level.
Product Level Eﬀect of Wal-Mart Entry
The results presented above indicate that DFF increased sale frequency in response to Wal-Mart's entry.
If the purpose of these additional sales was to induce certain customer groups to make a trip to the store,
then we would expect the additional sales to be focused on certain products. The data allow us to evaluate
which categories and products experienced an increase in sales. To do this, we estimate linear probability
regressions for each category.11 Each observation is a UPC-store-week, and the dependent variable Saleijt
is a binary indicator of whether product i was on sale in store j during week t. We measure an individual
product's popularity as its share of category revenue over its life and across all stores.12
We begin with a simple model that averages Wal-Mart's eﬀect across all products:
Saleijt = β1Distjt + β3Qt + cij + eijt (3.3.2)
where cij is unobserved UPC-store heterogeneity that is ﬁxed over time. A negative β1 coeﬃcient implies
that the average frequency of sales across the entry category would rise in response to a decrease in the
distance to the nearest Wal-Mart. Next, we add the interaction of Sharei and Distjt to evaluate whether
11Results from probit or logit models are qualitatively similar to those found in our linear probability model.
12Our contention is that Sharei is determined by consumer preference rather than by store-level weekly promotion ﬂuctua-
tions. Hosken and Reiﬀen (2004) use the same procedure to deal with endogeneity.
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stores selected popular products to discount in response to Wal-Mart. The model becomes:
Saleijt = β1Distjt + β2Distjt × Sharei + β3Qt + cij + eijt (3.3.3)
Here, the eﬀect of competition with Wal-Mart depends on the category (through β1) as well as the product's
popularity (through β2).
Table 3.3 shows the results of the two models described above. In the model without the share
interaction, seven out of 17 categories have a signiﬁcantly negative coeﬃcient on Distjt. However, when the
interaction is included, the category-level eﬀects all but disappear. β1 remains signiﬁcantly negative for only
3 categories (Bathroom Tissue, Bottled Juice, and Frozen Juice), while β2 is signiﬁcantly negative for 15 of
the 17 categories. We conclude that popular products not only experienced the largest increase in sales, but
the frequency of sales on less popular products seems to have decreased.
The coeﬃcient estimates from the model summarized by equation 3.3.3 are summarized in Figure
3.3.3, which displays the average eﬀect of a 35 mile reduction in the distance to Wal-Mart for the 5th, 50th,
and 95th percentiles of Sharei. The median response is generally close to zero, and the only signiﬁcant
responses are found for the most popular products. The UPC-level approach provides additional evidence
that the rise in sales across DFF stores was the result of competitive behavior rather than a general increase
in sales.
The results discussed above are also consistent with loss-leader models that suggest ﬁrms will ad-
vertise low prices on only a few products (often below marginal cost) to attract shoppers who purchase other
proﬁtable products. For example, DeGraba (2006) illustrates how a low price on turkeys during Thanks-
giving will attract a Thanksgiving dinner host who will also purchase a long list of other products needed
for the dinner. Lal and Matutes (1994) argue that loss-leaders should be purchased frequently and costly
to store. The pattern of coeﬃcient estimates across categories match quite well with these characteristics,
in that, the majority of categories that were sold often or were costly to store had negative and signiﬁcant
signs whereas the rest had positive and signiﬁcant signs. Taking the "loss-leader" hypothesis a step further,
Hosken and Reiﬀen (2004a) ﬁnd that stores tend to put popular products on sale. Once again this matches
our results, suggesting that Dominick's employed a "loss-leader" type strategy in selecting which items to
put on sale.
The Eﬀect of Wal-Mart on Other Aspects of Sales
While we have focused on the frequency of sales, Dominick's could also have adjusted their pricing strategy
on other margins, such as sales depth, in response to Wal-Mart entry. The depth of a sale (the percentage
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Figure 3.3.3: Change in Frequency of Sales For 35 Mile Drop in Distance to Wal-Mart
Notes: This ﬁgure plots the estimated eﬀect of a 35 mile decline in distance to Wal-Mart (approximately the sample
average) on the frequency of sales for each of three share percentiles, by category. The values are calculated by evaluating
Equation (6) at diﬀerent revenue share percentiles (5%, median, and 95%) for each category. Stars denote categories that
have a negative and signiﬁcant coeﬃcient on share. The underlying coeﬃcients and standard errors are available upon
request.
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Table 3.4: Regression Results Using Alternative Measures
Store Store-Category
Sales Discount Markup Sales Discount Markup
Distance -0.051*** 0.100*** 0.025*** 0.028*** -0.094*** 0.059*** 0.006 0.013**
(0.007) (0.006) (0.003) (0.003) (0.008) (0.006) (0.004) (0.004)
Linear Trend 0.024*** 0.001 0.025*** 0.001*
(0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000)
Observations 30,977 30,977 31,856 31,856 519,673 519,673 542,758 542,758
0.036 0.289 0.089 0.090 0.025 0.092 0.004 0.005
Notes: The ﬁrst two columns report results of a ﬁxed eﬀects panel estimate of two diﬀerent models that use the store as the
unit of analysis. Sales discount is the percentage diﬀerence between sales price and regular price. Markup is the percentage
diﬀerence of all prices from their cost. The store level model includes a vector of quarter dummies and the store-category
model includes a vector of category x quarter dummies to control for seasonal eﬀects for the chain and category respectively.
The distance coeﬃcients are reported in percentage points per mile. T-Statistics are in brackets. Standard errors are clustered
by store, and regressions are weighted by Revenue Share of Cell. * denotes signiﬁcance at 10%; ** at 5% level and *** at
1% level.
discount versus regular price) is not mechanically related to the frequency. DFF may have reduced sales
depth in order to minimize the eﬀect on average price of increasing frequency. On the other hand, they may
have also increased the depth of sales as well as the frequency with the hope of attracting more shoppers.
We regress the sale discount for the store and store-category levels in Table 3.4. Contrary to the
previous results, the eﬀect of distance on sale depth depends on whether a trend is included. Wal-Mart's
distance has a negative relationship with discounts when a trend is not included, but a positive relationship
when it is. The sales discounts, therefore, increased across the entire Dominick's chain. Unless this increase
was a chain-wide response to Wal-Mart, then the depth of sales seems to have declined as the frequency
increased.
We also examine each store's average price markup p−cp to provide a view of the entire price response
to Wal-Mart. Holding regular price constant, an increase in the frequency or depth of sales reduces average
markup. However, DFF may have chosen to increase the regular price markup to mitigate the eﬀect on of
more frequent sales on average markup. We estimate that the eﬀect of Wal-Mart on markup is unambiguously
negative. This result is consistent with other studies of Wal-Mart entry that ﬁnd incumbent stores reduced
average prices in response to Wal-Mart. Moreover, the ambiguous results on the depth of sales lead us to
conclude that much of the decline in markup was the result of an increase in the frequency of sales.
Conclusion
Drawing from related strands of research in the marketing and economics literature, we ﬁnd that an increase
in the frequency of sales can be a rational response to competition with a low cost retailer. The data from
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a representative chain of grocery stores support this strategy: stores which came into competition with
Wal-Mart signiﬁcantly increased their average frequency of sales. Moreover, the increased price promotion
activity was focused on loss-leader products, providing additional evidence that the behavior was a strategic
response to Wal-Mart entry rather than a coincident change in some other factor (e.g. promotion activity
initiated by manufacturers).
This study has implications for two other areas of research. First, there have been several macroeco-
nomic studies that evaluate the role of sales in price adjustment. The topic was initiated with the observation
that prices change frequently, but that many of these changes are the result of sales (Bils and Klenow, 2004).
Several recent studies attempt to reconcile the frequent adjustment of prices, that is largely due to sales,
with the cornerstone assumption of price stickiness embedded in New Keynesian macroeconomic models
(Eichenbaum et al., 2011; Guimaraes and Sheedy, 2011; Kehoe and Midrigan, 2010). These studies ﬁnd
that nominal rigidities are still important in spite of the frequent price adjustments associated with sales.
Our results, however, caution against concluding that sales are unimportant for aggregate price adjustment
because we show that temporary price reductions may be used in response to a persistent shock.
Second, Nakamura and Steinsson (2008) ﬁnd that the fraction of price quotes that are sales has
increased substantially over the last two decades. Certain product categories, such as breakfast cereal or
potato chips, are now on sale twice as often as they were in the late 1980's. As the expansion of Wal-Mart
took place over the same period, our results suggest that Wal-Mart could be at least partially responsible
for the rise in sales.
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APPENDIX
3.A Demand in a Hotelling Model
Suppose there is a measure 1 of switchers who are distributed uniformly across the unit interval and diﬀer
only in their cost of visiting the entrant. Denote a switcher's type as i ∈ [0, 1]. Switchers of type i face a cost
of visiting the entrant of d(i) = id¯ where d¯ is the highest cost any switcher incurs to visit the new store. The
marginal type who would be indiﬀerent between visiting the new store or not is i˜ = pB−pc
d¯
. All switchers of
type i < pB−pc
d¯
purchase from the entrant, and the rest purchase from the lowest priced incumbent.
3.B Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1
To prove that choosing a price of r in every period is part of an SPNE in pure strategies, we propose a
punishment for deviating and then check to make sure it is credible and eﬀective. Because there is no pure
strategy equilibrium in the stage game (except in very special cases), the punishment cannot involve reverting
to a bad equilibrium forever.
Suppose the punishment for deviating is to charge a price equal to marginal cost, c, for t periods. In
period t+ 1, both ﬁrms resume charging a price of r unless another deviation occurs. If either ﬁrm deviates
during the punishment, the punishment starts over from the beginning. The duration of the punishment,
t, is chosen to be as large as possible such that:
δt(α+ 12 )(r−c)
1−δ ≥ α(r−c)1−δ This inequality ensures that the
punishment is credible. The RHS is the continuation value of charging r forever assuming that the opponent
charges something less than r. The LHS is the present value of proﬁts assuming that after the punishment,
both players go back to charging r every period. Rearranging terms, we can see that the most severe
punishment that is credible would be to choose the largest t such that:
δt ≥ 2α
2α+ 1
(3.B.1)
For this threat to deter deviations, we must ensure that a one shot deviation is unproﬁtable. Therefore,
the punishment will prevent deviations if:
(
α+ 12
)
(r − c)
1− δ ≥ (α+ 1) (r − c) +
δt
(
α+ 12
)
(r − c)
1− δ
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Which will be satisﬁed as long as:
1− δt
1− δ ≥
α+ 1
α+ 12
(3.B.2)
Which implies that the lower bound for δ is 12 for the SPNE to exist. Combining 3.B.1 and 3.B.2, we have:
δ ≥ α− 1
α+ 1
(3.B.3)
The conditions under which the monopoly price can be supported are summarized by 3.B.3. The RHS of
3.B.3 is bounded above by 1 and increasing for α > 0. We assume that the discount factor δ ∈ (0, 1]. Thus,
a largerα, requires that ﬁrms must be more patient support the monopoly price.
Maximum Proﬁts Attainable by Incumbents
We claim that having a single incumbent charge a low price while the other charges the monopoly price results
in the highest possible joint proﬁt level for the incumbents. We prove this claim by contradiction. Suppose
that the incumbents explicitly collude and set prices jointly. Suppose that the cartel found it optimal to set
both prices to p < r. Let  = r − p. The cartel's proﬁts in this case would be 2pα+ p (1− p−pcd ). If instead
the cartel had a single ﬁrm charge p < r and the other charge r, its proﬁts would be rα+ pα+ p(1−(p−pC)d =
α+2pα+ p(1−(p−pC)d , which is α more than if the cartel set both prices to p. Therefore, setting both prices
below r cannot be optimal.
Proposition 2
We prove Proposition 2 in two sections. First, we establish the prices charged by all ﬁrms in the equilibrium
proposed in Section 3.2. Next we show that the punishment strategy is both credible and eﬀective.
Equilibrium Prices
Here we establish the price that C will charge in every period as well as the sale price that A and B will
alternate with the monopoly price r. Recall that we assume C plays a best response to the lowest priced
incumbent and the sale price is assumed to maximize the single period proﬁts of the ﬁrm having a sale,
given the price that C is charging.
Without loss of generality, we begin by assuming that pA ≥ pB . Because ﬁrm C will always choose a
price pC ∈ [pB − d, pB ], its proﬁts are:
piC = pC
(
pB − pC
d
)
if pC ∈ [pB − d, pB ]
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piC is maximized as long as one of the following conditions hold:
dpiC
dpC
=

pB−2pC
d ≤ 0 ⇐⇒ pC = pB − d
pB−2pC
d = 0 ⇐⇒ pC > pB − d
which implies that ﬁrm C's optimal response function is:
pC = pB − d iﬀ pB ≥ 2d (3.B.4)
pC =
pB
2
iﬀ pB < 2d (3.B.5)
W assume that only one of the incumbents will select a low price in any given period. It has been
shown that such a strategy results in the maximum possible proﬁts between the two incumbents. Now I
wish to determine the sale price. Suppose, without loss of generality, r = pC ≥ pB . The proﬁts earned by
ﬁrm B are:
piB =

(pB − c)
(
α+ 1− pB−pCd
)
iﬀ pC + d ≥ pB ≥ pC
(pB − c) (α+ 1) iﬀ pC ≥ pB ≥ 0
(pB − c)α iﬀ r ≥ pB ≥ pC + d
We can disregard the second case because we have already argued that C would never ﬁnd such a scenario
optimal. Thus the relevant best response function for ﬁrm B is characterized by:
pB =
d(1 + α) + pC + c
2
iﬀ d(α− 1) ≤ pC ≤ min {d (α− 1) + c, 2r − c− d(α+ 1)} (3.B.6)
pB = r iﬀ pC < r − d (3.B.7)
Now we proceed to identify the prices p∗B and p
∗
C that are mutually best responses. These equilibrium
prices will depend on the parameters r, d, c, and α. We are interested in the case in which pB < r which is
only possible when condition 3.B.6 holds. There are two possible scenarios to consider. The ﬁrst is when
3.B.4 also holds:
pB =
d(1 + α) + pB − d+ c
2
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Which implies:
pB = dα+ c , pC = d(α− 1) + c
If this were an equilibrium, then C's share would be
p∗B−p∗C
d = 1, which implies that the cartel would
sell to none of the switchers. This is only optimal if p∗B = r because the cartel would only charge a price
strictly less than r if they could sell to some of the switchers by doing so. Thus, the combination of 3.B.6
and 3.B.4 cannot represent an equilibrium where p∗B < r.
The second scenario involving p∗B < r occurs when 3.B.5 and 3.B.6 hold:
pB =
d(1 + α) + pB2 + c
2
and pB < 2d
This implies that:
p∗B =
2
3
(d(1 + α) + c) , p∗C =
1
3
(d(1 + α) + c)
Next we ensure that the inequalities are satisﬁed. Condition 3.B.5 requires that:
2
3
(d(1 + α) + c) < 2d⇒ 2− c
d
> α
Condition 3.B.6 requires:
1
3
(d(1 + α) + c) ≤ 2r − c− d(α+ 1)⇒ 3r
2d
− c
d
− 1 ≥ α
and
1
3
(d(1 + α) + c) ≥ d(α− 1) + c⇒ 2− c
d
≥ α
Note that the ﬁrst and last condition are the same. Thus, equilibrium price for ﬁrm C and the sale
price for the incumbent are:
p∗B =
2
3
(d(1 + α) + c) , p∗C =
1
3
(d(1 + α) + c)
iff α ≤ min
{(
2− c
d
)
,
(
3r
2d
− c
d
− 1
)}
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Proof that punishment is credible and eﬀective
To complete the proof of Proposition 2, we must show that the punishment outlined in 3.2.2 is credible
and harsh enough to prevent the incumbents from deviating. In the analysis below, we take a diﬀerent
approach than Lal (1990) in order to add in marginal costs and address some technical issues. To compress
the notation we deﬁne the following additional variables:
∆p , ∆r =proﬁt to an incumbent charging r¯ when the other incumbent charges p, r respectively
δp , δr¯ = proﬁts to a defecting ﬁrm when the other ﬁrm charges p, r respectively
Π =
∑∞
t=0 δ
trα = rα1−δ =discounted proﬁts of selling only to your loyal customers forever
The punishment strategies given in 3.2.2 are credible ((1) and (2)) and eﬀective ((3) - (5)) under the following
conditions:
1. piA = rαδ
t∗−1 + ∆rδt
∗
+ rαδt
∗+1 + ... = δ
t∗−1
1−δ2 (rα+ δ∆r) ≥ Π
2. piB = ∆pδ
t∗−1 + rαδt
∗
+ ∆rδ
t∗+1 + ... = piA ≥ Π
3. δpδ
t∗−1 + δt
∗
piA ≤ piB
4. rαδt
∗−1 + ∆rδt∗ + δr¯δt
∗+1 + piAδ
t∗+2 ≤ piA
5. ∆rδ
t∗−1 + δt
∗
piB ≤ piB
Conditions (1) and (2) state that the continuation value of the punishment sequence for the two incumbents
(piA and piB) must be at least as large as the discounted proﬁts from serving only loyal customers, Π.
Conditions (1) and (2) also indicate how t∗ and p are selected. t∗ is chosen so that it is as large as possible
without violating inequality (1), ensuring that the threat is as severe as it can be and still be credible. The
price p is chosen to satisfy (2), that piA = piB .
Condition (3) is required so that A will not deviate in period t∗. Condition (4) ensures that A will
not deviate in period t∗ + 2. Finally, (5) ensures that B will not deviate in period t∗.
We now analyze when it is possible for conditions (1)  (5) hold. First notice that (3) always holds
when (5) holds. This is simply because δp < ∆r. ∆r is the proﬁt one incumbent makes when the other
charges a price of r. The quantity δp is the proﬁt that an incumbent could make if it were to deviate when
the other is charging a price p < r. Since ∆r is the best a ﬁrm can do when the other charges r, we know
that δp < ∆r. Therefore if (v) holds, so does (iii).
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Table 3.5: Numerical Examples of Existence Conditions
∆r
rα 1.1 1.5 2 5 10
min δ .96 .82 .83 .74 .69
t∗(min δ) 2 2 3 3 4
Because (3) is redundant, we analyze conditions (1) (2) (4) and (5) to ﬁnd the parameter values for
which they can be satisﬁed. Rearranging terms in (1) we can see that the duration of the punishment, t∗
depends on ∆rrα . Speciﬁcally, t
∗ will be the largest integer that satisﬁes:
∆r
rα
≥
(
1 + δ − δt∗−1
δt∗
)
To interpret this condition, notice that the RHS is increasing in t∗ (because δ ∈ (0, 1)). Secondly, the
ratio ∆rrα > 1 can be interpreted as a measure of the temptation to cheat when the ﬁrm is supposed to be
charging r, the high price. The larger the temptation, the harsher is the punishment must be.
The next step is to use inequalities (4) and (5) to determine what values of δ make the threat severe
enough. It turns out that the lower bound on δ also depends on the ratio ∆rrα . First, notice that δr¯ will be
less than but arbitrarily close to ∆r. If the incumbent deviates when her opponent charges r¯, then the best
she can do is to slightly undercut her opponent's price and obtain a proﬁt slightly less than ∆r. Because ∆r
is the upper bound on the single period proﬁts earned by A if she deviates, then we can substitute ∆r for
δr¯ in (4) and still be certain that A will be deterred from deviating in period t
∗ + 2. After the substitution,
(4) and (5) can be written as:
∆r
rα
≤ 1− δ
t∗
1− δ − δ2 + δt∗+1 if 1 > δ + δ
2 − δt∗+1
This is a bit tricky to interpret. When the RHS of the inequality is positive, then it must be larger
than ∆rrα . When the RHS is negative, conditions (4) and (5) are always satisﬁed. The existence of an SPNE
of the form described above depends on the magnitude of ∆rrα which we know is larger than 1. In the table
below, we provide diﬀerent levels of ∆rrα with the corresponding t
∗ for the minimum level of δ that make the
strategy a credible and eﬀective threat.
These results diﬀer from those reported in Lal (1990). He claims that the strategy proﬁle given in
3.2.2 is an SPNE as long as δ > .62, regardless of the level of ∆rrα . We show here that the minimum possible
discount factor depends on the size of the gains from alternating sales relative to the outside option.
Nevertheless, even small levels of proﬁts gained by selling to the switchers will result in alternating sales if
the interest rate is low enough.
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The ﬁnal step is to show that charging a price of r and r¯ in alternating periods using the proposed
punishment strategies is a Nash equilibrium. Said diﬀerently, a one shot deviation cannot be proﬁtable. This
will be true if:
1
(1− δ2) (rα+ ∆rδ) ≥ δr¯ + δpiA (3.B.8)
It is easy to show that 3.B.8 is satisﬁed if (5) is satisﬁed. Thus, the strategy proﬁle in 3.2.2 constitutes
a sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium as long as δ is large enough given ∆rrα .
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3.C Dominick's Finer Foods Sample Selection
The DFF sample oﬀers a large number of products and stores, but there are several stores, UPCs, and
UPC-store cells with very few observations. The main concern is that we cannot be sure of the reason for
sparsely populated data. For instance, a UPC-store cell with only one year (out of a possible seven) may
represent a product deletion or incomplete data records. We want to make sure that the variation in the
fraction of products on sale at a particular store is not aﬀected by changes in the mix of available data.
Attempting to balance this objective with the desire to use as much data as possibly, we implemented the
following selection procedure:
1. Drop the ﬁnal 18 weeks of the sample because it represents only a partial-year of data.
2. Drop any category that does not span the entire sample period.
3. Next, we break up categories based on the relative number of products.
(a) For smaller categories (Bathroom Tissue, Bottled Juices, Cereals, Dish Detergent, Fabric Soft-
eners, Front End Candies, Frozen Fruit Juices, Laundry Detergent, Paper Towels, Refrigerated
Juices, Snack Crackers, Toothpaste, and Tuna)
i. Drop all UPC-store cells with less than 165 observations
ii. Drop any store with less than 40 products in a category
(b) For large categories (Analgesics, Cookies, Frozen Entrees, and Soft Drinks)
i. Drop all UPC-store cells with less than 180 observations
ii. Drop any store with less than 50 products in a category
To illustrate how much of the data is excluded, Table 3.6 presents summary statistics before and after the
sample selection is taken. Although we delete nearly 2/3 of the UPC-store cells, we still analyze 80% of the
raw sample's revenue.
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